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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the diverse environmental narratives found in more than 200
stories published by two Mexican national newspapers, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, in
1983 and 1984, a period of economic and environmental crisis. It argues that the
popularity of environmental issues permitted column space for journalists,
environmentalists, researchers, rural peasants, the urban poor, and government
administrators to present their many different environmental narratives for the reading
public’s consideration. Focusing on how journalists and their sources described air
pollution, forests, and water crises in the pages of Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, this thesis
brings out many of the common themes and persuasive tactics these narrative crafters
utilized in their efforts to imprint an environmental perception on the national population.
While environmentalists, researchers, and the poor contributed narratives which
illuminated environmental crises and blamed them on Mexico’s industries and federal
government, a smaller number of government spokespeople constructed narratives which
promoted an environmentally-friendly image of a government that was attuned to these
crises and best suited to address them.
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INTRODUCTION

The Many Environmental Narratives of Mexico

Armed with machetes and clubs, 2,000 campesinos (peasant farmers) from
southwest Tabasco established blockades near the town of Chontalpa in the autumn of
1983 in order to deny Mexico’s national oil company, Pemex, access to 300 of its oil
wells. The campesinos claimed that repeated oil spills over the last twenty-five years had
rendered their once rich lands unproductive, and that Pemex had failed to deliver on
promised compensation for damages of 4,123,000,000 pesos (about twenty-eight million
1983 US dollars). One of these campesinos, Isaac De la Cruz Arévalo, told Excélsior
reporter A. Sepulveda I., “we are not willing to put up with any more tricks from Pemex,
or from anyone else. We will fight for the payment of the compensation even at the cost
of our lives.”1
As a reporter covering the blockade, Sepulveda played a critical role in explaining
the campesinos’ struggle to the nation. The blockaders could relate their side of the story
to the reporters covering the blockade, but reporters wrote the stories read by the nation.
Any personal biases or ulterior motives held by reporters shaped their telling of the story.

1
A. Sepulveda I., “Bloquean labriegos 300 pozos de Pemex,” Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico),
Oct. 1, 1983; In this thesis, all of the translations from Spanish to English are my own.
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Therefore, reporters reshaped the narrative of the crisis to the nation at large in writing
the stories.2 While Sepulveda chose to criticize Pemex for damaging the land, another
reporter covering this story might have written off the peasants as unreasonable agitators.
For those who read the explanation of events printed in Excélsior, Sepulveda’s
description contributed to the understanding of the reality of the Chontalpa blockade.
Newspaper reporters, therefore, played an outsize role in crafting the many national
narratives on pollution, conservation, and other environmental issues.
In analyzing the environmental narratives published in two national newspapers,
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, several major themes appear: blaming some entity for an
environmental problem, linking environmental problems to health risks, and defending
the federal government’s handling of environmental issues. Environmentalist reporters
frequently blamed industry or the government for causing pollution or failing to regulate
it.3 They also criticized government policies that permitted the unsustainable use of
natural resources like forests. Government-friendly reporters, on the other hand,
frequently criticized Mexican society for lacking environmental awareness. Many of
these reporters blamed campesino subsistence-logging for the loss of forest resources or
the urban poor for contaminating water resources. Government-friendly reporters also
tended to promote the federal government as the appropriate channel through which

2

In 1980s Mexico, and in many countries today, the media plays a large role in defining which
issues are social problems and which are not. For more analysis on the implications of this phenomenon
see: Mark Neuzil, The Environment and the Press: From Adventure Writing to Advocacy (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2008), 192.
This is a common theme in Latin America. See: Silvio Waisbord, “Contesting Extractivism:
Media and Environmental Citizenship in Latin America,” in Environmental Conflict and the Media ed.
Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2013), 107-09.
3
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environmental problems could be redressed, and often touted current government policy
as environmentally-friendly.
These two newspapers, therefore, served as a platform from which reporters and
their sources sought to convince the public of the accuracy of their environmental
narratives, which included attempts to shape Mexicans’ perceptions of the current
condition of the environment. Analyzing common themes in these national
environmental narratives permits a more comprehensive understanding of how Excélsior
and Uno Más Uno journalists presented these issues for public debate. The prevalence of
environmental stories in these papers in 1983 and 1984 suggests that environmental
issues were popular enough among readers for editors and journalists to deem them
worthy of coverage. This popularity permitted column space for the proliferation of the
many environmental narratives competing for public attention. Excélsior and Uno Más
Uno, therefore, in using the environment to sell papers, also encouraged a discourse on
environmental issues which added, in turn, to readers’ understandings of Mexico’s
environment.
This thesis examines the discourse on Mexico’s environmental narratives through
an analysis of more than 200 environmental news stories from two national newspapers,
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, in the years 1983 and 1984. The stories in this sample came
from an archive of around 8,000 environmental news stories assembled by political
scientist Stephen Mumme for his research into environmental politics in Mexico during
the 1980s and early 1990s. By focusing on a smaller sample within the archive, this thesis
conducts a deeper analysis on the selected articles than would be permitted if the sample
size was larger. Furthermore, by delimiting the analysis to two newspapers within a
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narrow time frame, this thesis provides a richer characterization of the content it does
cover than could be conducted on the entire archive, given the constraints of this project.
The sample used for this thesis includes 216 stories in chronological order, and displays a
breadth of topics and styles.4 Journalists covered many different environmental topics,
including agricultural problems, conservation efforts, erosion and desertification,
problems with garbage dumps, illegal animal smuggling, dangers from pesticides, air
pollution, forests, and water crises. This thesis focuses on the final three topics listed
because journalists covered them more frequently in this sample than any other topics.5
The stories from Excélsior span from August 2, through October 28, 1983, and the stories
from Uno Más Uno span from April 1, through October 12, 1984.
Newspaper Name

Date Range

Number of Articles

Aug. 2 – Oct. 28, 1983,

92

Excélsior
January 10 – Feb 3, 1984
Uno Más Uno

Apr. 1 – Oct. 12, 1984

124

The sample covers a period between an important international summit on
pollution between Mexico and the United States in the summer of 1983 and the first
Mexican National Congress on the Environment held in the summer of 1984. Mexico
faced a succession of environmental crises during this period, and the governmentorchestrated environmental meetings demonstrated a need for the federal government to

4

The sources are chronological with the exception of a 14-series editorial by Raul Olmedo entitled
“Our Lost Forests which ran in Excélsior in January-February 1984.
5
In categorizing articles into topics, I read the article and categorized it based on its content.
Sometimes articles covered multiple topics. In these instances I placed the article into multiple categories.
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respond to these crises. This period nicely exhibits the lively discourse surrounding
Mexico’s environmental narrative.
Mumme’s archive presents different challenges than would a Mexican newspaper
archive. For one, Mumme may have missed some articles, or ignored certain issues that
were not of interest to him. However, in a correspondence, Mumme indicated he was able
to “achieve complete coverage” of environmental issues in 1983 and 1984 in Excélsior
and Uno Más Uno.6 Regardless of whether his claim is legitimate or merely an
exaggeration, the diversity of articles Mumme assembled still provide enough examples
to understand which environmental issues appeared most frequently in newsprint, and the
quantity of articles he collected still demonstrate a journalistic concern over
environmental issues. In the sample used for this thesis, for example, Excélsior averaged
about eight environmental stories a week while Uno Más Uno averaged fourteen.
An analysis of Excélsior and Uno Más Uno during this period showcases
environmental reporting from both a pro-government (Excélsior) and an independent
(Uno Más Uno) newspaper. Because Excélsior and Uno Más Uno represented different
ends of the ideological spectrum they serve as great contrasting examples by which to
analyze the different ways in which Mexican reporters covered environmental issues. In
the early 1970s, Excélsior had been an independent paper, and a vocal critic of
government policies. But in 1976, the federal government expelled the chief editor and
many other top editors and installed a government-friendly team. More than 200
employees quit in solidarity, and many of them helped to establish Uno Más Uno, which

6

Stephen Mumme, e-mail message to author, August 28, 2015.
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started publishing news stories on November 14, 1977. In 1983 and 1984, Excélsior
operated as a government-friendly newspaper, and Uno Más Uno prided itself on factbased investigative reporting.7
Communication scholar Sallie Hughes argued that in the 1980s Mexican
journalism was in a period of transition, in which the role of journalists shifted from
being mouthpieces of the state to becoming servants of the public. Before this transition,
the majority of Mexican journalists viewed themselves as honorary government
employees – even though they officially worked for a newspaper – and they in turn
churned out stories echoing the government line. Hughes argued that this arrangement
protected the government from criticism while providing the journalists with job security.
Hughes labeled this model “authoritarian journalism” and the emerging model “civic
journalism.”8 Although this thesis reveals that Excélsior tends to fit Hughes’s
authoritarian model by supporting the government’s environmental policies, and Uno
Más Uno tends to fit Hughes’s civic model by criticizing the government, the bias in
either paper is not absolute. Stories bucking the respective trends exist in both Excélsior
and Uno Más Uno, demonstrating that some reporters, at least, had the freedom to assert
their own opinions even if they conflicted with the newspaper’s philosophy.
Reporters who wrote frequently for these papers, however, generally fit well with
their respective papers’ ideological orientations. Teresa Weiser, for example, covered
environmental issues for Uno Más Uno, and wrote twenty-three of the reports in this

7

Chappell Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in
Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 66-68;
8
Sallie Hughes, Newsroom in Conflict: Journalism and the Democratization of Mexico
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 4.
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sample. She frequently used descriptive, creative writing to generate a dystopian image
describing victims of pollution. Weiser also criticized those she believed guilty of
environmental transgressions, often listing the names of polluting corporations in her
stories. Fernando Césarman was a psychoanalyst, ecologist, environmentalist, writer,
editor, and columnist who made frequent contributions to Uno Más Uno promoting
environmentalism. Like Weiser, Césarman used creative writing to persuade readers of
the dangers of pollution and the need for meaningful government action, but his style was
less confrontational in that he did not name names. Instead, Césarman’s writings
encouraged Mexicans to recognize the importance of a clean environment and to do what
they could to help improve environmental conditions across the country. Raul Olmedo
was a political scientist specializing in public administration who wrote editorials for his
column called “La Crisis” for Excélsior from 1977 through 1984.9 He wrote about
Mexican policies and, in January 1984, included a lengthy series on the state of Mexico’s
forestry industry. Olmedo generally supported the ruling party’s plans for forestry
development and used his column to convince readers of the efficacy of government
policy. The writing styles of these three journalists, and those of all the others included in
this sample, showcase the diverse perspectives environmental reporters contributed to the
many environmental narratives competing for the attention of Excélsior and Uno Más
Uno readers.
Because Excélsior and Uno Más Uno were national papers, their reporters
covered environmental issues spanning the diverse terrain, climates, and ecosystems

9
1977 was the year after Excélsior became a government-friendly paper and the year that Olmedo
started writing for it.
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across all of Mexico. The Baja California peninsula extends for 775 miles along the west
coast, and is typified by arid deserts and rugged mountains, except for the far north where
coastal cities like Tijuana and Ensenada experience a Mediterranean climate similar to
southern California. The rest of northern Mexico is defined by two major mountain
ranges, the Sierra Madre Occidental which rises in Sonora along the Arizona border and
parallels the Pacific coast south to Jalisco, and the Sierra Madre Oriental which rises in
Coahuila near the Texas border and runs southeast to Veracruz. Both of these ranges
collect enough moisture due to their higher elevations to support vast temperate forests of
deciduous and coniferous trees, but the lower elevations near the two ranges are marked
by hot deserts whose cities frequently suffered from water shortages in the early 1980s.
The exception to this are the lowlands east of the Sierra Madre Oriental, where ample
moisture from the Gulf of Mexico supports the northernmost tropical rainforest in the
Americas, the Huasteca in northern Veracruz and southern Tamaulipas.
The Sierra Madre ranges run into the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt, which
extends along an east-west axis from Jalisco to southern Veracruz encompassing the
traditional heartland of Mexican society. This is the most populous region of the country,
with large cities like Guadalajara, Mexico City, and Puebla lying in high-elevation basins
and valleys surrounded by the even higher volcanic peaks that extend throughout the
region. The Valley of Mexico (technically an endorheic basin that now has a manmade
outlet to the Gulf of Mexico via the Tula and Pánuco Rivers) dominates this region both
politically and demographically – although it only occupies 0.03 percent of Mexico’s
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territory, it was home to twenty-three percent of its population in the early 1980s.10 At
more than 7,000 feet above sea level, the Valley of Mexico also serves as the headwaters
for many of central Mexico’s major rivers. Due to the industrial runoff and lack of
sewage treatment from a metropolis with thirteen million people, these rivers were
severely polluted right from their sources in the early 1980s. The climate in the TransMexican Volcanic Belt is typified by wet summers and dry winters. Air pollution can be
especially bad here in the winter season when stagnant temperature inversions trap
pollutants in these valleys and basins. The mountains of the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt
historically held vast temperate forests similar to those of the Sierra Madres, but centuries
of forest harvesting had left much of this region eroded and degraded by the early
1980s.11
Southern Mexico is marked by a transition from temperate forests to tropical
forests. The Sierra Madre del Sur branches off of the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt,
running through Michoacán, Guerrero, and Oaxaca before tapering off at the Isthmus of
Tehuantepec. This range is typified by temperate forests in higher elevations and dry
tropical forests in lower elevations. On the eastern side of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec,
the Sierra Madre de Chiapas rises in the state of Chiapas and continues southeast into
Central America. The Lancandon rainforest grows along the northern slopes of the Sierra
Madre de Chiapas and continues north into the southern Yucatan Peninsula. The

10
Exequiel Ezcurra, “The Basin of Mexico,” in The Earth as Transformed by Human Action:
Global and Regional Changes in the Biosphere over the Past 300 Years ed. B.L. Turner II, William C.
Clark, Robert W. Kates, John F. Richards, Jessica T. Mathews, and William B. Mayer (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 577.
11

Ibid, 580-81.
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Lancandon experienced rapid deforestation for much of the twentieth century due to
logging corporations, and to a smaller extent, slash-and-burn agriculture.12 The heavy,
drenching rains of this region easily wash away the poor tropical soils of deforested
areas, which means that once the jungle is gone it is nearly impossible to reestablish.13
The northern Yucatan Peninsula is marked by flat, karst topography, with dry tropical
rainforest. Many news stories in this thesis’s sample cover deforestation and erosion
problems in the forests of Oaxaca, the Lancandon rain forest, and the dry tropical forests
of the Yucatan.
While Mexican environments may be quite diverse, in this thesis, Mexican
environmentalism is defined rather narrowly. When this thesis uses the term “Mexican
environmentalism,” it refers to any Mexican articulation of concern for: 1) the ecological
health of an environment or any species thereof; 2) the health of people living in an
environment in which the resources needed for life are contaminated; and 3) the quality
or quantity of a natural resource deemed important to the national economy. While others
may define Mexican environmentalism differently based on the period and sources under
research, this definition derives from the pattern of environmental discussions structured
and shaped by Mexican reporters and their sources in 1983 and 1984 in the two
newspapers used for this thesis.

12

For insight into the extent of the damage and how it has altered the cultures of its residents see:
Lourdes Arizpe, Fernanda Paz, and Margarita Velázquez, Culture and Global Change: Social Perceptions
of Deforestation in the Lancandona Rain Forest in Mexico (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press,
1996).
13

Perhaps no one has explained more eloquently the vulnerability of tropical rain forests to
deforestation than Warren Dean, see: Warren Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the
Brazilian Atlantic Forest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 4-5.
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Mexican environmentalism fits in with a recent wave of environmentalism, one in
which the meaning of the word is acutely tied to contamination and pollution in ways that
earlier articulations were not. Lane Simonian defined this Mexican environmentalism in
Defending the Land of the Jaguar, describing the environmental movement there as first
and foremost an attempt to prevent pollution from making people sick.14 Recent
American environmental historians have expanded the connection between pollution and
people, linking environmental contaminants and human bodies in increasingly intimate
and scary ways.15 Civic environmental action centered around advocacy for causes like
safe drinking water, breathable air, industrial accountability, and the protection of soil for
peasant farmers. These were the issues that propelled Mexican environmental reporters to
action.
The environmental reporting of the early 1980s arose in a larger political context
shaped largely by the course of Mexican history in the decades following the Mexican
Revolution (1910-1920). Many different factions fought for political control of Mexico
both during and after the Revolution, with frequent assassinations throughout the period.
In 1929, former President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) established a political party
that would become Mexico’s ruling party for the rest of the century, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party, or PRI.16 The new party succeeded in appropriating the social ideals

14

Simonian. 203-18.

15

See: Christopher C. Sellers, Hazards of the Job: From Industrial Disease to Environmental
Health Science (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Linda Nash, Inescapable
Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2007); Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies: Hormone Disruptors and the Legacy of DES (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2010).
16

The PRI had different names in its early years. Calles called it the National Revolutionary Party
(PNR). President Lázaro Cárdenas renamed it the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938.
President Miguel Ávila Camacho gave the party its current name in 1946.
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of the Revolution during the 1930s, effectively returning political stability to Mexico.17
One of its more popular policies was to establish ejidos, land held communally by
peasants for use by the community from generation to generation. The party consolidated
its hegemony during the economic boom known as the Mexican Miracle (1940-1970), in
which the PRI’s policies of import substitution and industrialization sustained a period of
impressive economic growth. The PRI had an authoritarian streak, however, and party
leaders often conducted violence against Mexicans who demonstrated against the party in
the mid-twentieth century. But most Mexicans enjoyed the thriving economy and social
benefits seemingly guaranteed by the PRI, so the ranks of dissenters remained small
enough that PRI leaders could effectively repress them or buy compliance by
redistributing income and resources plentiful in the booming economy.18
The PRI started to lose hegemony in the 1970s due to a combination of social
protest and mounting economic crisis, a process that accelerated in the 1980s. The
Mexican economy cooled off during the global 1970s recession, but money from large oil
reserves discovered in Veracruz and Tabasco in 1976 helped to mask many of Mexico’s
systemic economic problems.19 Wishing to avoid foreign ownership of Mexican
resources, the PRI had nationalized many of Mexico’s industries in the 1930s and 1940s,
but this lack of competition often gave rise to unproductive, inefficient companies funded

Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez, “Strongmen and State Weakness,” in Dicta Blanda: Politics,
Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938-1968, ed. Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2014), 120.
17

18

Jo Tuckman, Mexico: Democracy Interrupted (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 14.

19
Brian R. Hamnett, A Concise History of Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006), 262.
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and run by the federal government.20 President José López Portillo unwisely leveraged
this new anticipated oil revenue to acquire numerous foreign loans with high interest
rates in order to keep the bloated federal government funded.21 In 1981 the price of oil
plummeted, and Mexico could no longer meet its loan payment obligations. From 1983
through 1988 about seven percent of the nation’s gross national product went to servicing
the debt, more than what Mexico spent on education and health services combined.22
Harvard-educated economic technocrat Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988)
assumed the presidency amidst this economic crisis, and started embracing neoliberal
reforms as a way to decrease government expenditures and increase foreign capital
infusion. De la Madrid’s new neoliberal state brought flexible labor market laws, cuts in
social welfare programs, and increased privatization.23 These changes, pushed by foreign
lenders in the United States and Europe, allowed Miguel de la Madrid to reschedule debt
payments, but the austerity measures left many millions of impoverished Mexicans
without a social safety net of support. Ejidos, with their land and resources restricted
from sale by the need for community consensus, were threatened by the move to
privatization, and many government-friendly reporters in this thesis’s sample described
them as backwards and unproductive. While Mexican neoliberalism was in its infancy in
1983 and 1984, several articles among the sample covered in this thesis demonstrate how

20

Ibid, 241, 263.

21

Ibid, 266.

22

Alicia Hernández Chávez, Mexico: A Brief History, trans. Andy Klatt (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2006), 308.
23

David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29.
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the federal government was trying to implement the privatization of Mexican forests and
promote the policy as environmentally-friendly.
As De la Madrid’s government debated the future of Mexico’s economic policies
in 1983 and 1984, most Mexicans were simply trying to survive the present economic
slump. Many scholars have argued that the economic collapse of 1982 provoked the loss
of long-held single-party PRI hegemony over Mexico and sparked the rise of autonomous
civic action groups opposing government policy on a number of issues, including the
environment.24 Voices of opposition to the PRI started to play a significant role in the
national conversation, and the kinds of stories told by environmental reporters reflect this
change. In short, Mexicans lost confidence in the federal government’s ability to manage
Mexico, and autonomous social movements and non-governmental organizations
challenged the government’s role as sole guarantor of social justice.
In response to these non-governmental environmental actors, President De la
Madrid launched a campaign to convince Mexicans that the federal government was both
cognizant of environmental problems and proactive in addressing them.25 Stephen
Mumme labeled this effort “preemptive reform,” arguing that the primary motive for

24
See for example: Jordi Díez, Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 13; Paul Lawrence Haber, Power From Experience: Urban Popular
Movements in Late Twentieth-Century Mexico (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
2006), 62; Neil Harvey, “The Difficult Transition: Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism in Mexico,” in
Mexico: Dilemmas of Transition, ed. Neil Harvey (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 4; Hughes, 7;
Oscar J. Martínez, Troublesome Border (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 110; Stephen P.
Mumme, “System Maintenance and Environmental Reform in Mexico: Salinas’s Preemptive Strategy,”
Latin American Perspectives 19, no. 1 (1992): 125.
25

This phenomenon of environmental groups forcing environmental issues into the public and
political arena is not limited to Mexico. For more discussion of the relationship between non-governmental
environmental organizations, media, and the government, see: Alison Anderson, “Source-Media Relations:
The Production of the Environmental Agenda,” in The Mass Media and Environmental Issues, ed. Anders
Hansen (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 62.
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embracing environmentalism was to head-off any non-governmental environmental
action that might lead to government criticism or protests.26 Upon assuming office in
1982 De la Madrid created Mexico’s first environmental protection ministry, SEDUE. In
the summer of 1983 he met with President Ronald Reagan in Baja California to sign an
environmental protection border agreement with the United States. Furthermore,
President Miguel de la Madrid devised, and then spoke before the first National
Environmental Congress, held in Mexico City in June 1984. It is against this backdrop
that the environmental reporters of 1983 and 1984 wrote their stories and shaped their
environmental narratives.
Several authors have discussed the environmental crises and subsequent rise of
civic environmental action in Mexico in the 1980s, but unfortunately, most of them have
neglected to incorporate the important role of the newspaper into their argument. Many
Mexican and American ecologists, environmental sociologists, economists, and historians
have argued that the massive population growth of the Valley of Mexico in the second
half of the twentieth century gave rise to many environmental problems both inside and
outside the valley.27 Mexican scholars Enrique Torres Lopez, Mario A. Santoscoy, José
Luis Lezama, and Victor Alejandro Payá Porres have described spontaneous urban
uprisings or demonstrations as responses to these serious environmental threats to the
health of the citizens.28 Several historians and political scientists have argued that

26

Mumme, 127-128.

27

Ezcurra, 577-588; Luis Lezama, 23; Ortiz Monasterio, 231-34; Joel Simon, Endangered
Mexico: An Environment on the Edge (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1997), 77-90; Garza Villarreal,
269; Beatriz A. Albores Zárate, Tules y sirenas: el impacto ecológico y cultural de la industrialización en
el Alto Lerma (Zinacantepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, A.C., 1995), 368-369.
28

Enrique Torres Lopez and Mario A. Santoscoy, La historia del agua en Monterrey: Desde 1577
hasta 1985 (Monterrey: Castillo, 1985), 89-91; José Luis Lezama, “Metropolitan Environmental
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government attempts to channel these environmental movements into official state
structures, Mumme’s “preemptive reform,” only encouraged further nongovernmental
environmental advocacy.29 Sallie Hughes and Lane Simonian have suggested the
important role newspapers played in propelling this movement forward, but neither of
them attempted a thorough historical analysis of environmental newspaper reporting.30 In
1983 and 1984, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno directors viewed environmental issues as
popular enough to warrant frequent column space. Their efforts to sell newspapers with
environmental issues exposed a diversity of environmental narratives to the reading
public. In analyzing these narratives, this thesis presents a clearer understanding of the
specific strategies those involved with environmental issues employed in order to
compete for public attention among the many environmental narratives on display in
Mexico’s newspapers.
Water crises, forests, and air pollution were the top three most discussed topics in
the sample of papers used for this thesis, and therefore make up its three chapters.31 Aside
from being important simply because they were the most discussed issues, water crises,
forests, and air pollution had social relevance. Mexico City in the 1980s suffered from the
world’s worst air pollution and it worsened throughout the decade. Many other cities like
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Coatzacoalcos in the south and Ensenada in the north also suffered from unhealthy air.
The first chapter explores the narrative surrounding air pollution – which groups took
part in the discussion, how they explained the dangers, and who they tried to blame for
creating it. The analysis reveals a national debate over culpability and government
policies as well as concern for human health.
Chapter 2 transitions from the smoggy cities to the deforested countryside, where
environmental protection advocates tried to quantify the damage while sustainable
logging promoters argued over the best way to extract more wealth from Mexico’s
forests. Here the national narrative centered around finding a way to use forest resources
in a way that did not lead to environmental crisis, even as rampant deforestation left large
swaths of the country ecologically damaged and agriculturally unproductive.
Deforestation wreaked havoc on ecosystems, farmland, rivers, and the campesinos who
depended on the health of all of these elements for their subsistence. As the destruction of
Mexico’s forests accelerated in the early 1980s, the federal government introduced a new
forest policy that encouraged the privatization of forest resources, and newspapers reveal
efforts by the federal government to convince Mexicans that this policy was the right
move.32
Chapter 3 examines the national narrative surrounding water pollution and water
shortages. Millions lacked access to clean water, and were subjected to frequent
outbreaks of water-borne diseases affecting tens of thousands. These water crises proved
to be the most acute environmental threat. Mexicans were much more likely to die from
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water contaminated with sewage or industrial waste than from any other form of
pollution.33 In addition, many regions of the country faced water shortages in 1983 and
1984 which threatened their economic prosperity.34 Newspapers carried the efforts by
many different social groups to describe the problems, to blame those they believed
guilty for causing them, and to present reasons why those who had access to clean water
should care.
The frequency with which environmental stories appeared in these two Mexican
newspapers throughout 1983 and 1984 reflects both the severity of the environmental
crises facing the nation and the loss of faith in the federal government to address it. Even
many who did not define themselves as environmentalists took part in the battle to
control the narrative evolving in the newspapers in an attempt to secure access to clean
water and air. Newspaper reporters led the way in pressuring the federal government to
respond to environmental problems. Sometimes these responses resulted in a cleaner
environment, such as the reduction in air pollution over the Valley of Mexico starting in
the 1980s, and dramatically improving in the early 1990s. In other cases, governmentfriendly reporters merely tried to put an environmental spin on policies the PRI wanted to
implement anyway, such as the campaign in the 1980s to describe the privatization of
forests as an environmentally-friendly action. That reporters mentioned the environment
at all is a testament to the penetration of environmental advocacy within Mexican society
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in the 1980s, a process that newspapers facilitated and sustained. The drive to clean up
the air was one of the most successful, and so this thesis begins there.

20

CHAPTER 1
“We Would Flee to the Mountains Desperately Looking for Breathable Air”:
Excélsior, Uno Más Uno, and the Battle for Clean Air

In April 1984, award-winning Mexican author Fernando Césarman wrote an
editorial condemning the lack of government action to effectively deal with Mexico
City’s chronic air pollution. He noted that the city did not need special scientific
equipment in order to see how bad the problem had become; the smog was plainly visible
with the naked eye. Yet, Césarman observed, most people went about their lives just the
same, everyday inhaling the dangerous chemicals while doing nothing to fight for cleaner
air. In order to convince readers of the absurdity of this situation, Césarman proposed a
thought experiment, “If the air typical of the region was more clear, and we awoke one
morning to suddenly find the gray cloud of smog, the shock would be of such magnitude
that we would either not come out of our houses or we would flee to the mountains
desperately looking for breathable air.”35 Césarman argued that the slow increase of air
pollution over the years permitted Mexicans to become accustomed to it, and this is what
allowed for such complacency in the face of a deadly threat.
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The doom and gloom in Césarman’s style was not unusual among Mexican
reporters covering air quality throughout the 1980s, and journalists had reason to be
concerned. Air quality was especially poor in the Valley of Mexico where a combination
of topography, climatology, and shortsighted national development policies had given
rise to an environmental nightmare. Mexico City lies in a large basin surrounded by high
mountain ranges that hinder the dispersal of air to surrounding regions. Furthermore,
thermal inversions – in which a cooler layer of air at the surface becomes trapped below a
more stable, warmer layer above – typically occur in the valley more than 250 days a
year. The Valley of Mexico’s location ensures that regions of high pressure – typified by
dry, sunny days and light winds – dominate the city’s weather pattern. Finally, the
valley’s 7,380 foot elevation means there is twenty three percent less oxygen in the air
than exists at sea level, which causes combustion engines to burn less efficiently, thereby
releasing more pollutants into the atmosphere.36 Policies aimed at centralizing industry
brought government and commerce into the Valley of Mexico in the decades after the
Revolution. Mexican political leaders encouraged a prodigious population increase in the
valley, which grew from nearly three million in 1950 to thirteen million by 1980.37 As the
number of vehicles (more than two million in 1980) and industrial complexes increased
in the valley, Mexico City residents soon found themselves inhaling some of the world’s
most unhealthy air.38 However, air pollution was not limited to the Valley of Mexico.
Cities in the northwest, like Ensenada, Baja California, also suffered from inversions that
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trapped air pollutants for long periods of time. In Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, in southeast
Mexico, a large oil refining industry ensured that skies stayed polluted no matter what the
weather did.
Mexican journalists churned out reports on air quality more frequently than
reports on erosion, pesticide risks, or the depletion of natural resources. Unlike these
other crises, urban Mexicans of all social classes experienced air pollution in a very
tangible way; they awoke to its smell in the morning, their sinuses burned and their eyes
watered as they inhaled industrial particulate emissions, and many suffered from pinkeye
infections just from going outside.
Throughout 1983 and 1984, Uno Más Uno and Excélsior reporters published
news stories and editorials on air pollution that generally presented one or more of the
following approaches: blaming poor air quality on a specific group; linking air pollution
with other phenomena such as poor health or deforestation; or applauding government
efforts to improve air quality. The quantity and content of these stories suggests that
Mexican journalists were concerned about the dangers poor air quality posed.
Furthermore, the frequent blaming of Mexico’s government and industry for air pollution
suggests that many reporters viewed their own society as broken and incapable of
addressing serious problems surrounding public health. Meanwhile, in the very same
newspapers, government administrators exuded confidence in the government’s ability to
improve the nation’s air quality, thus providing readers with an alternative environmental
narrative. News stories from this sample, then, demonstrate that most reporters covering
air pollution served as public watchdogs and educators, but about twenty percent worked
to deflect criticism aimed at the federal government and to promote policies supported by
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the PRI. Furthermore, the reporters who played the roles of watchdog and educator
placed Mexico’s air pollution in the spotlight, pressuring government administrators to
finally take meaningful action to improve air quality in the 1990s.
The rest of this chapter will be divided into three sections that analyze the tactics
of reporters serving as watchdogs, educators, and government defenders. “Affixing
Blame” examines the watchdog role environmental reporters and various sources played,
and the tactics they used to shame polluters and pollution-enablers into action. “Linking
Air Pollution with Other Problems” examines the educator role reporters and their
sources played in making connections between air pollution and other phenomena like
human and ecological health problems. “The Government is the Solution” analyzes those
reporters and government administrators who presented an alternative air pollution
narrative in Mexico’s newspapers, one in which President De la Madrid and his priístas
were already leading Mexico to an environmentally friendly future.39
Affixing Blame
By blaming different entities for Mexico’s air pollution and explaining the
physical characteristics that contributed to it, reporters helped Mexican readers
understand why their air was so unhealthy and thus provided figures on which Mexicans
could focus their anger. For example, journalist Teresa Weiser described the existence of
a garbage dump on the periphery of Mexico City as such: “the authorities have set up an
enormous landfill at the foot of La Caldera hill, on the edge of the highway, whose filth is

Because Mexico’s government was so thoroughly dominated by one political party in 19831984, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), I consider the terms “federal government” and “PRI” to
be interchangeable and will treat them as such throughout this chapter. Priístas is a Spanish word that
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dispersed in a radius of hundreds of meters and passers-by breathe in a fermented stench
that warns visitors that they have arrived in Mexico City.”40 In this case Weiser blamed
the foul air emanating from the garbage dump on the government, but other stories
highlighted different guilty figures. The complexity of understanding all of the various
factors that contributed to air pollution – such as industrial emissions, automobile
exhaust, government policies, and weather patterns – ensured that most Mexicans could
not untangle the mix of variables that made their air dangerous to breathe. Environmental
reporters brought order to this tangled web, usually focusing on only one or two variables
per story, which enabled readers to acquire knowledge about the problem story by story,
rather than overwhelming them with too much information at once. By assigning blame,
reporters also gave readers a focal point for their anger, which sometimes manifested
itself in the form of civil demonstrations. Naming those responsible for air pollution
exposed these entities to public ridicule and empowered Mexican readers through
education.
Mexico’s industries proved to be popular targets among environmental reporters,
and they typically couched their stories in one of two ways: general blaming, or blaming,
naming, and shaming. Many articles blamed industry in general for air pollution and
drew links between emissions and environmental or human health problems. Others
published lists of specific corporations or industrial complexes in an attempt to shame
them or the government into action. While articles falling into the general blaming
category helped readers understand why air pollution was a problem, articles that also
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named and shamed the perpetrators confronted the problem in a very direct manner,
giving readers the knowledge needed to take a stand for clean air, should they choose to
do so.
Javier Cruz A. filed a story for Excélsior in September 1983, reporting in the
general blaming style. He explained that industrial waste contaminated both the air and
the water in Ensenada, Baja California, and that between ten and fifteen percent of the
city’s population suffered from respiratory or eye illnesses due to gases and powders
from nearby industries. Cruz used the story’s byline to focus attention on the scope of the
problem, writing, “Every Day Some 30,000 Ensenadans Breathe in Gases and Dust
Spewed by Factories.”41 While the story noted that the persistence of thermal inversions
contributed to poor air quality – a problem in this coastal state as well as in the Valley of
Mexico – Cruz accentuated the role played by Ensenada’s industries, rather than the
climate, in perpetuating the city’s suffering.
An unnamed author published an article with a similar sentiment toward industrial
pollution for Uno Más Uno, evincing a sense of hopelessness and anger with which many
Mexican readers must have identified. The author wrote of a nationwide problem: “In
Mexico, not only do the foreign-owned corporations pollute, but so do the domestic ones,
and their harmful effects result in serious deterioration of the air…The lack of control and
respect to the rules of emission and environmental quality enable industries to release
their pollutants with minimal fear of being sanctioned even though transnational
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corporations have been expelled from other countries for these causes.”42 In noting the
“lack of control and respect to the rules of emission,” the author also implicated the
government in looking the other way rather than enforcing air quality regulations. In this
article, industry and government were partners in crime, and everyone in the Valley of
Mexico suffered from their corruption. Furthermore, the author compared Mexico
unfavorably with other nations in terms of environmental protection by noting that other
countries had the fortitude to remove offending transnational polluters from their borders
while even Mexican companies did not seem to care about Mexico’s environment.
Some reporters and sources took things a step further, targeting not just industry
in general, but rather blaming, naming, and shaming specific industrial plants and
corporations that polluted the air. In a story for Excélsior Mario Ruiz R. named twelve
industries in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, that released their untreated industrial waste into
the air and rivers of the city.43 The author claimed that area residents suffered from
respiratory and gastrointestinal problems due to the pollution released by these industries.
Seven months later, Uno Más Uno published a similar story, in which co-authors Teresa
Weiser and Jesús Lastra named specific industrial plants and corporations polluting
Coatzacoalcos: “The atmospheric pollution comes from a multitude of industrial plants
concentrated in this area and in order to give an idea of the magnitude of the smoke and

42
La ciudad de México, una de las urbes más contaminadas del mundo,” Uno Más Uno (Mexico
City, Mexico), May 25, 1984.

Mario Ruiz R., “Pasividad de las autoridades federales,” Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico), Sep.
12, 1983, here is a list of the companies cited by the author: Pemex, Tetraetilo de México, Cloro de
Tehuantepec, Industrias Quimicas del Istmo, Celanese Mexicana, Industrias Resistol, Fertimex,
Fenoquimia, Tereftalatos, Azufrera Panamericana Liquid Carbonic, Temsa, and Iquisa.
43

27
gases they emit, here is a list of the major factories…”44 Weiser and Lastra then listed
thirteen factories, six of which were also listed by Mario Ruiz R. The authors detailed the
environmental damage caused by this pollution. They also included a picture of a
residential neighborhood in the foreground with thick black smoke in the background
filling the horizon. Perhaps because Coatzacoalcos is 600 kilometers from Mexico City
(where Uno Más Uno was published) the authors felt the need to include visual evidence
of the environmental destruction occurring in this important port city.
Whereas Mexico’s ruling party, the PRI, had responded to criticism with
cooption, repression, or violence for most of its existence, in the 1980s a cascade of crises
in Mexico emboldened critics. From runaway inflation and a sagging economy, to
environmental issues like air pollution, journalists started challenging the official party
line in increasing numbers in a plea for greater democracy.45 Journalists like Weiser and
Lastra used many techniques – reporting on the ecological damage, including visual
evidence of pollution, and describing the health impacts on local residents – to gain the
moral authority needed to stand in judgment of Mexico’s industry and government,
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which they leveraged into a public shaming undertaken by naming the perpetrators in the
newspaper.
By interviewing them, reporters shared the watchdog role with their sources,
giving them a platform from which they could blame industries or corporations for
fouling the air. For example, in a story concerning air pollution in the eastern Valley of
Mexico, Teresa Weiser interviewed Eréndira Espinoza, a spokesperson from the
Committee of Ecological Preservation at the National School of Professional Studies –
Zaragoza, who took aim at a nearby industrial plant: “We see the inhabitants of the Army
of the East housing unit affected by the acute pollution recorded in the area, principally
by the Minerales No Metálicos factory [located 12.5 kilometers away] which twenty-four
hours a day emits all kinds of substances and dust with serious effects on the health of the
population.”46 In linking gases and dust emitted by Minerales No Metálicos with skin,
eye, and respiratory tract damage among nearby residents, Espinoza hoped to bring
negative attention to this particular factory.
By 1983, Mexico’s nationalized oil industry, Pemex, had essentially become an
autonomous branch of the government, with few regulations and a horrendous
environmental record.47 So when two academics criticized Pemex’s March 18 Refinery in
an Excélsior story, they were also criticizing the government.48 A 1983 study undertaken
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by New York University concluded that Azcapotzalco, Mexico (also in the Valley of
Mexico), had the second worst polluted air in the world. In response, reporter Juan G.
Reyes interviewed two faculty members at Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM)
– Azcapotzalco to ask them why. Yolanda Falcón Briseño, from the university’s Energy
Department, blamed Pemex’s March 18 Refinery, and suggested that it was a poor
decision to build an oil refinery in the Valley of Mexico. Ruth Alvarado, the director of
ecological projects at the university, also criticized this government-run industry: “Pemex
should shelve its publicity campaigns as this money would be better spent taking
measures that truly help to prevent pollution.”49 Both academics felt compelled to blame
Pemex for the air pollution, even though doing so risked embarrassing an authoritarian
regime.
Many environmental reporters confronted government policymakers more
directly, calling out the corruption, cronyism, and poor decisions that gave rise to
Mexico’s world-famous air pollution. In general, these criticisms fell into two categories:
bad government administrators, or bad government policies. Stories focusing on the
former drew attention to government inaction or corruption. Journalists harped on the
lack of effective measures for mitigating air pollution and traced this problem back to
local, state, and federal government administrators. Other reporters focused on specific
government policies that encouraged air pollution, or even worse, actively created it.
Juan Gerardo Reyes called attention to carcinogenic chemicals in the air, noting
how they are especially dangerous to infants, thereby drawing a tangible link between
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government officials and diseases afflicting Mexicans and their children. In a report for
Excélsior, Reyes explained, “Mexico City’s air pollution had already passed the limits
that humans can tolerate without danger,” and that, “furthermore, the measures
implemented up to this point to combat air pollution are insufficient, and frequently
remain mere projects, due to changes of government and the neglect of some
authorities.”50 With his story, Reyes accused government authorities of failing in their
duties to protect Mexicans from poisonous pollutants. As noted in the Introduction,
Excélsior was a government-friendly newspaper, but Reyes’s criticism demonstrates that
Excélsior’s support of the PRI was merely a trend, not a rule.
In a story written by Teresa Weiser, Dr. Humberto Bravo, director of the
Department of Environmental Pollution at the Center for Atmospheric Sciences at the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), criticized lawmakers for failing to
establish clear standards for air quality. He explained that without standards there was no
way to quantify levels of atmospheric pollutants such as carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide,
lead, and ozone. Weiser delved into the details with Dr. Bravo, providing readers with the
numerical percentages specific pollutants constituted in Mexico City’s atmosphere and
what safe levels were, but her role as public watchdog was evident in the headline:
“Deficient and inadequate: the air quality standards of the law to protect the
environment.”51 While Weiser’s article was full of scientific facts and figures for readers
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interested in the data, her headline summarized the underlying message – your
government legislators are not doing enough to protect your air.
In other situations, reporters did not merely accuse government administrators of
neglect, but rather asserted that government policies actively made air quality worse;
Teresa Weiser used this approach a month after her story on the lack of air quality
standards to cover the source of widespread E. coli infections in the Valley of Mexico.
On the valley’s east side, near Nezahualcóyotl, there existed a large seasonal lake called
Xochiaca that consisted primarily of sewage. Every dry season the lake evaporated,
allowing the prevailing winds to carry dust and E. coli bacteria into the Valley of Mexico
where people breathed it in, suffering respiratory infections as a result. Weiser
interviewed Jorge Paulat, who helped create the Health System for Nezahualcóyotl and
revealed some unsettling information about Xochiaca’s origins. Paulat said that starting
in the late 1950s, government administrators of the Federal District (comparable to the
District of Columbia in the United States) decided the basin was a convenient place to
dump sewage from the city when other sewage channels proved insufficient.
Furthermore, he claimed that authorities found Xochiaca to be a cheap and effective
deterrent to the construction of new slums. He explained that Mexico City “is the only
great human concentration where they [government administrators] not only allowed, but
rather created an infectious lagoon of the magnitude of Xochiaca.”52 To help bring this
cesspool to life for her readers, Weiser included three large pictures showing the lake
filled with trash. She also used her descriptive writing skills to connect government
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decisions with this lake of filth: “A foul odor announces its presence from kilometers
away, and once it comes into view, the panorama is bleak. Amongst some green aquatic
plants that manage to reproduce in this lagoon of sewage, the waste stands out: tires,
bottles, plastic bags, diapers, and excrement float, defining an enormous and nauseating
scum. At the same time, clouds of flies and mosquitos proliferate along its banks where,
on the other side, and separated only by the asphalt ribbon for a large median, hundreds
of children play soccer.”53 The article concludes with Paulat’s claim that the government
could drain Xochiaca in less than fifteen days, and convert the space into a park or
recreation complex to impede new settlement. By including this revelation, Weiser
reinforces the notion that this is a fixable problem, and that government policy is the only
barrier to a cleaner environment.
Teresa Weiser also employed subtler tactics to undermine government legitimacy
on environmental issues, as her coverage of Mexico’s first National Environmental
Congress demonstrates. When President Miguel de la Madrid spoke before the Congress
in June 1984, he called on the Mexican people to change their ways. The President noted
that each day every Mexican contributed to the improvement or deterioration of the
environment, so the government needed to promote an ecological conscience among the
people. Of course the amount of pollution emitted by government-run industries, like
Pemex, or poorly regulated private industries contributed a much larger share of the
nation’s pollution than each individual Mexican, but Miguel de la Madrid spun the
nation’s environmental crisis: “The responsibility…belongs to the whole community,
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certainly the government, but also to each and every Mexican.”54 The President, and
following government speakers, went on to discuss all the bureaucratic restructuring then
underway to improve Mexico’s environment by facilitating improved communications
between the government and the community. In short, President de la Madrid seemed to
suggest that the Mexican people’s callous ways were ruining Mexico’s environment, but
together, the nation could improve air quality under the guiding hand of the government.
Teresa Weiser covered this speech, and had many possible environmental topics from the
assembly on which she could have focused – like the introduction of a new air quality
monitoring network in the Valley of Mexico, or the transition of fuel oil to natural gas at
the March 18 Refinery. But Weiser, a longstanding environmental reporter, titled her
story, “The State is not solely responsible for the environment, affirmed de la Madrid,”55
subtly criticizing the President’s rhetoric, and showcasing the government’s attempt to
shift the blame for the nation’s pollution to the Mexican people.
Some environmental reporters, however, transmitted the idea that Mexicans really
were to blame for their degraded air quality, and their motives for doing so varied from
raising environmental awareness among readers to promoting the government’s blameshifting to the public. In an editorial for Uno Más Uno, Fernando Césarman referred to
the national air pollution problem as a “chronic crisis,” and noted that despite years of
warnings about the dangers of air pollution, “we [Mexican society], the source of the

Teresa Weiser, “No es solo responsabilidad del Estado la ecología, afirmó DLM,” Uno Más
Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), June 10, 1984.
54

55

Ibid.

34
danger, are not willing to listen and do something to improve the situation.”56 He went on
to suggest that “It is not possible that we are so paralyzed that absolutely nothing can be
done to improve the environmental conditions. It is really surprising.”57 In this sample,
Césarman never blamed individuals in his environmental reporting. Instead, in addressing
environmental concerns he preferred to blame Mexican society in general. This is
strikingly different from the environmental reporting covered so far in that Césarman’s
readers were made to feel like part of the problem (and part of the solution), whereas
reporters like Teresa Weiser or Mario Ruiz R. placed the blame squarely on government
or industrial entities and framed their readers as victims, or at the very least, passive
observers. Because Césarman was an award winning essayist, author, and poet, with a
long record of promoting environmental issues, it is unlikely that he was merely parroting
the government line to ensure his continued employment as a journalist. Instead,
Césarman may have adopted this approach in an attempt to stir Mexican readers to
action; once people recognized that they were at fault they might take steps to reduce
their contribution to air pollution such as using public transit or tuning up their vehicles.
Newspaper readers, therefore, found different air pollution narratives in their papers –
there were stories blaming malevolent polluters, and there were stories blaming society in
general.
Similarly, Ramón Ojeda Mestre, president of the Mexican Academy of
Environmental Rights, also blamed contemporary Mexican society for its callous ways,
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but targeted the nation’s sixteenth-century Spanish conquerors as well. In a story
covering the toxic dust storms generated by Xochiaca, an unnamed reporter explained
Mestre’s views: “Ojeda Mestre expanded on the history of the problem pointing out that
it stems from a lack of an “environmental conscience” among the inhabitants of the
Valley of Mexico dating from the arrival of the Spanish. Our country lives in almost total
environmental irrationality, we are stunned trying to resolve the problems derived from
the economic crisis, both at a national and household level, and we ignore the
environmental disaster that accelerates more each day.”58 Whereas Césarman expressed
surprise at the nation’s inability to address these pressing environmental problems, Ojeda
Mestre argued that Mexico’s economic crisis had forced neglect of environmental
problems. Although Ojeda Mestre explained the nation’s unwillingness to improve air
quality as a symptom of a slumping economy, his underlying message blamed the
Mexican people as a whole, just like Césarman. Ojeda Mestre’s position as president of
the Mexican Academy for Environmental Rights suggests that he was not serving as a
mouthpiece for the state, but rather wanted to inspire Mexicans to do what they could to
improve air quality.
A Mexican Green Movement spokesperson also noted the lack of an
environmental conscience among the Mexican people in a newspaper article, although the
organization tempered this message by also singling out organizations that contributed a
higher percentage of air pollution, like the government-run bus company Ruta 100, local
cement factories, and the oft-blamed March 18 Refinery. The spokesperson told the
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reporter, “if the situation is in itself serious, it is further complicated by the incredible
indifference maintained despite the danger of a total disaster that can not be avoided
unless consciousness is raised concerning the magnitude of the pollution problem and the
people and the government work immediately towards a solution.”59 Although the story
primarily focused on a seven-point plan crafted by the Mexican Green Movement to
reduce pollution in the Valley of Mexico, someone at the paper decided to entitle the
article, “Danger of environmental disaster in the city due to the lack of social
conscience.”60 This title reinforced the message that the people of Mexico were to blame
for the dire environmental straits they were in, even though the heart of the story dealt
with efforts to improve the environment.
Some journalists chose to blame air pollution on individual drivers, rather than
government policies that encouraged the forty-year mass migration to the Valley of
Mexico while creating a transportation system designed for the personal automobile. One
reporter included Mexican vehicle owners along with greedy industries and inept
government leaders in a list of chronic polluters: “every year, automobile owners prove to
be more irresponsible by not maintaining their vehicles in a good state.”61 Similarly, at a
rally protesting pollution, Mexican Green Movement president Alfonso Ciprés Villarreal
named the Valley of Mexico’s millions of vehicles as “one of the chief factors” of air
pollution, thereby joining a notorious list that included heavy industries in the valley and
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the e. coli-laden dust storms originating from Xochiaca.62 About eighty-five percent of
Mexico City’s air pollutants came from vehicles, so drawing attention to the biggest
polluter in the valley was warranted.63 But blaming the drivers was shortsighted and
unfair, as many Mexicans were too poor to keep their vehicles in good shape, and
furthermore, the government, which owned Pemex, had done nothing to promote energy
conservation.
Linking Air Pollution with Other Problems
Aside from assigning blame, environmental reporters also connected air pollution
with other problems, especially heath and deforestation. The frequent occurrence of these
human and ecological health issues in environmental reporting reflects a desire among
reporters to find order among the complex relationships surrounding air pollution. By
explaining how air pollution directly caused human illnesses, reporters educated readers
as to why they were sick. Knowing the cause of their illness, Mexicans could then take
steps to alleviate it, such as advocating for better air quality, or protesting government
inaction.
Environmental reporters endeavored to uncover health problems across the
country related to poor air quality in order to convince the public of the dangers of
inhaling polluted air. In an article reporting on air pollution created by a zinc processing
plant in Saltillo, Coahuila, Joaquin Paredes wrote for Excélsior that “the emissions and
discharges of chemical substances from this plant cause serious damage to the respiratory
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tracts and to the eyesight of the inhabitants of this city.”64 Mario Ruiz R. wrote for
Excélsior in a similar style for a story about air pollution in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz:
“The effects of the air pollution on the health of the inhabitants of Minatitlán and
Coatzacoalcos reflect the high index of problems of the respiratory tracts and of
gastrointestinal illnesses. In both cities the people live within an asphyxiating
atmosphere.”65 In Ensenada, Baja California, Javier Cruz A. quantified the effects of air
pollution on the citizens of this northern coastal city: “Between ten and fifteen percent of
the population suffers from illnesses of the respiratory tract, caused by air pollution.”66 In
all three examples the authors made direct connections between air pollution and illnesses
in a very matter-of-fact way, and agreed that there was no question that air pollution
made people sick.
Mexican journalists often relied on the testimony of environmentalists to
communicate the dangers of air pollution. A news brief in Uno Más Uno quoted statistics
from the Mexican Green Movement, noting that in Mexico City alone more than a
million people suffered from respiratory illnesses, 250,000 from pinkeye, 260,000 were
afflicted with asthma, and a million people dealt with allergies.67 This particular story
appeared in the City and Government news brief section and consisted of only one
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paragraph, which suggests that journalists tried to communicate the dangers of air
pollution in different formats for different types of readers.
An unnamed author for Uno Más Uno communicated a similar message in a story
that at first glance appears to have nothing to do with air pollution. In a story about the
lack of green space in Mexico City, this journalist interviewed administrators from both
the Department of Preventative Medicine and the Office of Education for the Health of
UNAM who explained that “air pollution, due to urban and industrial activity, causes
illnesses like bronchitis, symptoms of asthma, and other respiratory distress.”68 The
reporter went on to examine the connection between trees and air quality, a common
narrative that is discussed later in this chapter.
As previously noted, Teresa Weiser interviewed Jorge Paulat from the
Nezahualcóyotl System of Health about the creation of Xociaca, a large lake of raw
sewage. She also relied on his medical expertise to communicate the health risks of the
dust clouds that blew off the desiccated lagoon in the dry season, spreading fecal bacteria
across the valley. He explained to her that, “the majority of Mexico City citizens have
developed resistance to this type of microorganism, but very often cultures of E. Coli are
found in the larynxes and pharynxes of patients.”69 While some people developed
respiratory illnesses like pneumonia as a result of E. Coli in the respiratory tract, most
Valley of Mexico residents had at least some resistance to the bacteria. Still, it must have
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been a shock for readers to learn that they were breathing in bacteria spawned from
human waste.
While many of the stories examined so far detailed illnesses that could be treated,
other environmental journalists explored the relationship between air pollution and more
dangerous diseases. Juan G. Reyes interviewed Yolanda Falcón Briseño from the
Department of Energy at UAM – Azcapotzalco about a study by New York University
that found Azcapotzalco’s air to be the second most polluted in the world. Briseño
warned that the impacts of poor air quality went beyond reduced visibility and higher
cases of asthma; the study revealed “the presence of heavy metals in the atmosphere,
especially the presence of highly cancerous organic particles that cause genetic
mutations.”70 In a front-page story detailing the many environmental crises facing the
Valley of Mexico, Dr. Enrique Riva Palacio Chiang, a professor of Pollution and
Environmental Degradation at UNAM, warned that breathing in the city’s air could,
“decrease one’s appetite, which causes damage to the digestive tract; cause breathing
difficulties, nausea, and vomiting; cause rapid heartbeat; and long-term impacts include,
kidney, liver and cardiovascular system diseases. In the nervous system mental disorders,
mild manias, hysterics, moodiness, and depression, as well as severe headaches have
been detected.”71 Surely these maladies aroused more concern among readers than
increased cases of bronchitis or pinkeye. The message was pretty clear: breathing Mexico
City’s air could kill you.
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If Mexico’s air was dangerous for adults, then it was especially dangerous for
children, whose bodies were still developing. Environmental reporters made efforts to
spread this message among the populace. In Victor Manuel Juárez’s frighteningly titled
news story “Pollution, one of the Top Ten Causes of Death in the DF [Federal District],”
the author noted, “Mexico City residents are condemned to suffer from respiratory
diseases because air pollution is such – detritus, smoke, dust, and various toxic gases –
that already, [it has reached levels that] turn out to be fatal.” He went on to note that this
pollution “causes gastrointestinal and ocular illnesses, mainly in children.”72 Another
story published a month later also drew connections between poor air quality and the
health of Mexico’s children. The unnamed reporter interviewed the President of the
Mexican Green Movement, Alfonso Ciprés Villarreal, who noted that “in Mexico City,
childhood illnesses have increased by 600 percent in recent years, as a consequence of
environmental pollution, and serious epidemics have occurred that have not happened
anywhere else in the world.”73 The journalist highlighted the significance of this alarming
increase in childhood illnesses by using the statistic as the story’s byline. Environmental
journalists wanted their readers to see the connection between air pollution and unhealthy
human bodies, and by focusing on the impacts of children’s bodies they likely hoped that
Mexicans would see how detrimental the pollution was to those least guilty of creating it
Another prominent connection Mexican journalists strived to make was the
relationship between air quality and deforestation. Trees remove air pollutants such as
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ozone, carbon monoxide, and sulfur dioxide by absorbing them, thereby creating a
cleaner atmosphere. In fact, a single tree can remove up to ten pounds of pollutants from
the air each year.74 Many reporters wrote stories lamenting the loss of Mexico’s trees,
especially in the Valley of Mexico, and raised concerns over the resulting degradation in
air quality. In a story for Uno Más Uno that discussed air pollution in Naucalpan,
Atizapán, and Tlalnepantla (Mexico City suburbs), local professor Francisco Manuel
Carreño Pantoja explained, “it is urgent to start reforesting these towns in order to
strengthen the green lungs [emphasis in original] that remain in these areas.”75 By
comparing the respiration of trees with the respiration of people, Carreño Pantoja
connected the health of the region’s ecosystem with the health of individual Mexicans.
A similar connection between air pollution and trees exists in an article published
to highlight the lack of green spaces in Mexico City. In it, Silvia Turpín, a professor at
UAM, noted that “Mexico [City] only has two lungs of oxygenation; El Ajusco and el
Desierto de los Leones [both nearby national parks], which are insufficient for the
seventeen million inhabitants of the Federal District.” Similar to the previous story, an
academic referred to trees as the city’s lungs in a metaphor intended to connect
deforestation with poor air quality. Indeed, one of the major objectives cited by the
Mexican Green Movement in an anti-pollution rally was their intention to plant 40,200
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trees in the center of Mexico City, mostly near schools so that children could breathe
cleaner air.76
The Government is the Solution
So far the sources examined in this chapter have largely been drawn from
academics, doctors, or non-governmental environmental organizations like the Mexican
Green Movement, but government officials and government-friendly reporters also
contributed air pollution narratives to Uno Más Uno, and especially, Excélsior.
Unsurprisingly, their comments often asserted that the government had the air pollution
problem under control, and frequently adopted a defensive tone when questioned about
the nation’s poor environmental record. Throughout his presidency, President De la
Madrid worked to cultivate an image of environmental sensitivity and awareness, best
exemplified by the 1984 National Environmental Congress. As mentioned in the
introductory chapter, political scientist Stephen Mumme labeled this effort “preemptive
reform,” suggesting that the president’s embrace of environmentalism was merely a ploy
to redirect non-governmental environmental action into government channels.77
Whatever De la Madrid’s motives, it is clear that Mexico’s government made a few
modest efforts to improve air quality in the 1980s, and government spokespeople used the
newspapers included in this sample to promote them.
Teresa Weiser noted the ignorance surrounding a quantitative understanding of
pollution levels for the Valley of Mexico by writing a story about the lack of an air
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quality monitoring network, and interviewed a government administrator who claimed
that the federal government was already taking steps to install such a network. While it
was possible at the time to measure particulate concentrations at the sources of industrial
emissions, there was no measuring equipment set up around the valley to measure air
pollution dispersed by the weather. The establishment of an air quality monitoring
network meant, for instance, that if sulfur dioxide levels climbed above seventy
micrograms per cubic meter (the guideline set by the World Health Organization) in
Azcapotzalco, Naucalpan, or Nezahualcóyotl, the measuring equipment could detect it
and then city administrators could issue a warning to area residents to limit their outdoor
exposure.78 The Pemex Manager of Environmental Protection, Francisco Ramírez
Chávez, agreed that a network of air quality measuring stations was needed, and assured
Weiser, “We believe that the authorities are going to determine the air quality that should
exist in the Valley of Mexico in real form and without having to take on foreign
owners.”79 In other words, the Mexican government could be trusted not only to operate
the network, but also to establish appropriate air quality standards. Furthermore, he
asserted that Mexico was capable of building the network without the financial assistance
offered by foreign capital.80
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One month after this story’s publication, the announcement of the network’s
creation was one of the key talking points at the National Environmental Congress, which
indicates that President De la Madrid wanted to reassure the population that
environmental issues were best managed through proper government channels.81 Other
major announcements at the conference included a switch to cleaner natural gas at the
March 18 Refinery, and that Pemex had made a six billion-peso investment to treat waste
water and gas emissions in order to improve environmental quality. Teresa Weiser,
usually a sharp critic of poor government environmental action, merely listed off the
improvements the government announced at the Assembly, and refrained from any overt
criticism. The majority of her story reads like a summary of the federal government’s
proactive battle against air pollution. It is possible that she was fearful of criticizing such
a highly publicized event. As noted above, the only hint of criticism appeared with the
title of her story, “DLM [De la Madrid] declares: The environment is not only the State’s
responsibility,” which could be construed to suggest that President de la Madrid was
shifting the blame for Mexico’s environmental problems and the onus to improve them
onto the people of Mexico.
In an article about the terrible pollution plaguing Coatzacoalcos, reporter Mario
Ruiz R. contrasted the environmental efforts of Pemex with other industries in the city.
He wrote, “Pemex has been the most responsible company concerning the government
laws to carry out pollution prevention and control in its facilities. The spokesperson for
the management of Pemex in the Southern Zone, Rafael Marquet, announced that this

81
Teresa Weiser, "No es sólo responsabilidad del Estado la ecología, afirmó DLM," Uno Más Uno
(Mexico City, Mexico), June 10, 1984.

46
year they allocated 486 million pesos for environmental protection, environmental
studies, and land restoration.”82 Ruiz then listed eleven companies in and around
Coatzacoalcos, naming and shaming them in an unfavorable light compared to the
government-run Pemex. While on the surface it appears that Ruiz was merely parroting
the government line, the story does include criticism of the government’s inability to
enforce environmental regulations among private industries. Yet Pemex (hardly a shining
beacon of clean energy) came out of the story looking good, and Mario Ruiz’s reporting
helped Rafael Marquet spread the word about the government’s efforts to improve the
environment.
Even as other reporters increasingly began to excoriate Mexico’s oil industry for
its air pollution, Pemex worked to cultivate an environmentally friendly image, appearing
frequently in newspaper articles announcing new measures designed to curb air pollution.
In May 1984, Pemex Manager of Environmental Protection, Francisco Ramírez Chávez,
announced the reduction of sulfur and lead in gasoline sold in the Valley of Mexico. He
explained that this measure would reduce the emission of atmospheric contaminants,
thereby resulting in cleaner air for Mexico City and its environs. The article closes with
an emphatic proclamation from Ramírez Chávez of Pemex’s commitment to being green:
“Pemex is ready to apply all appropriate actions to improve the environment.”83 When
the Director of Pemex, Mario Ramón Beteta, addressed the first National Environmental
Congress that following June, he noted this reduction of sulfur and lead among a list of
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other steps that Mexico’s oil industry had taken to improve the environment. He argued
that Pemex was not the primary source of pollution in Mexico, (although the cars that ran
on Pemex’s petroleum were). Moreover, he reminded the audience that Pemex had
allocated more than six billion pesos for environmental protection programs, and that the
company had transitioned from oil to natural gas at the March 18 Refinery.84 Teresa
Weiser reported all of these announcements in a story for Uno Más Uno, but also
included criticism espoused by Fernando Hiriart, the Director of the Federal Electric
Commission, who, at the same conference, called Pemex one of the biggest polluters in
Mexico and called for cleaner energy sources.85
Weiser’s article contained two different opinions on government environmental
accountability, and points to the larger debate occurring in the pages of Excélsior and
Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 1984. While the majority of environmental stories sampled in
this chapter came from journalists who best fit Hughes’s civic journalism model and were
not afraid to criticize government and industrial administrators and policies, these same
reporters often sourced government spokespeople who painted a more environmentally
friendly portrait of the government. The inclusion of both points of view, often within the
same story, suggests that most Mexican reporters covering air pollution made an effort to
write unbiased stories. Different points of view allowed readers to judge for themselves
which spokesperson best represented reality. Some journalists left this decision
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completely in the hands of the reader, while others, as demonstrated above with Teresa
Weiser, had a proclivity to subtly nudge readers toward the source that best fit what they
believed the truth to be.
By 1992 Mexico City had the worst air pollution in the world, and in response to
international and domestic criticism, Mexico’s federal government finally took measures
to improve air quality for their nation’s capital. It passed a law requiring catalytic
converters on all cars being sold in Mexico, and provided incentives for industry to move
out of the Valley of Mexico. Pemex introduced low-lead gasoline, and transitioned many
of its refineries to natural gas. As a result, there is less sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide,
and lead in the air now than in 1984, but the ever increasing number of vehicles in the
city still frequently give rise to days with unhealthy levels of ozone.86 Mexico City still
has work to do in terms of providing a breathable space for its citizens, but conditions are
drastically better than they were when these newspaper articles were published.
Environmental journalists placed Mexico’s air pollution in the spotlight in 1983
and 1984, and although it took several years, the government did finally take action to
improve the city’s air quality. In the PRI’s quest to modernize Mexico in the midtwentieth century, it had encouraged the growth of industry and population in the Valley
of Mexico. But the unintended side effect of this – terrible air pollution – opened the
regime up to both international and domestic criticism, which eventually forced party
leaders to enact mitigation policies in an attempt to maintain its modern image.
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By consistently reporting on air pollution, these environmental reporters kept the
pressure on government administrators. They showed their readers who and what was
causing air pollution, but equally important was understanding the connections between
poor air quality and ecological and human health. These relationships could be quite
complex, but Mexican journalists consulted experts in the field who could explain the
links between ecology, pollution, and health, and in doing so empowered Mexican
readers with the knowledge needed to advocate for change through civic action. At the
same time, President De la Madrid’s government worked to cultivate an image of
environmental sensitivity and awareness, and it sometimes used newspapers and
journalists to spread this message. While the means by which to improve air quality
differed depending on which story one read, the underlying message in Mexico’s papers
reporting on air pollution in 1983 and 1984 was that something had to change. The
abundance of stories about air pollution during this period demonstrate how critical the
problem had become, and reveal the conflictual nature of Mexico’s air pollution
discourse as told by journalists. But air pollution was not the only environmental problem
confronting Mexico, and newspapers reflected diverse environmental narratives on other
topics as well. As the next chapter on forests will show, not all problems were as
successfully managed as air pollution.
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CHAPTER 2
“Long Live the Tree!.Long Live Mankind!”: Journalists, Forests, and Mexico’s
Quest for Rational Development

During the summer of 1984, the government of the Federal District, the army, and
several surrounding city municipal governments launched a campaign of reforestation to
plant more than thirteen million trees across the Valley of Mexico. Award-winning
author and air quality advocate Fernando Césarman used his editorial column in Uno Más
Uno to praise the effort, and encouraged the seventeen to twenty million Mexicans living
in the valley to add to this total by each planting one tree. He wrote that, “[This citizen
planting] would be a task in the direction of life…To the motto of Long live the tree! we
should add Long live mankind!, that ultimately is what really matters.”87 But Césarman’s
editorial concluded with an alarming note: The Central Light and Power utility was
planning to clear cut a strip of forest in the hills surrounding the Valley of Mexico thirty
meters wide for forty kilometers in order to construct high tension power lines. To this he
sarcastically exclaimed, “Who cares [about the loss of all those trees]! We will not have
air but we will have plenty of electricity.”88 For Césarman, trees could best serve
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Mexicans as air filters, and cutting them down – even in the service of electrification –
was a foolish mistake.89
Political scientist Raúl Olmedo Carranza provided a very different opinion on the
future of Mexico’s forests in his thirty-five editorial series special entitled “Our Lost
Forests” for his daily column “The Crisis” in Excélsior. This author, who also worked as
a professor of political science and public administration at the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM), repeatedly called for a more efficient and active national
logging industry. In the first editorial of this series he lamented, “Each year, thirty million
cubic meters of wood is transformed into dust, disintegrated, to return in a cycle of
reincarnation in which it is converted into another thirty million cubic meters of wood
unexploited by man, that will once again be converted into dust.”90 In referring to
decomposing wood as dust, Olmedo described a nutrient replenishment cycle that had
sustained the forests for millions of years as merely a wasteful process that helps no one.
Pointing out that Mexico has more forest acreage than Norway, Sweden, or Finland,
Olmedo argued that harvesting Mexico’s forests would bring in much needed money for
more than ten million Mexicans. In contrast to Césarman, Olmedo thought his nation’s
trees would best serve the people as rationally-harvested wood and paper products that
could fuel a slumping economy. But his call for lumber products came with the warning
that the logging must be conducted carefully, “The harmful exploitation of forests and
jungles is evident in the fact that each year we lose 400,000 hectares. Erosion already
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affects sixteen percent of the national territory.”91 Olmedo believed that forests could
bring great wealth to Mexico, but only under the careful guidance of a rational federal
forestry policy.
As Césarman’s and Olmedo’s editorials demonstrate, newspaper articles from
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 1984 expressed concern over the nation’s
forests, and environmental narratives presented different opinions over which factors
constituted the biggest threats, and over what role Mexico’s trees should play in its
economy, ecology, and society. This is not surprising given the economic restructuring,
environmental crises, and increasing criticism of the government occurring throughout
the decade.92 Due to the soaring national debt, the federal government reexamined its role
in operating the nation’s logging industry, and transitioned to privatization in an effort to
cut costs. Campesinos (rural peasants) also felt the pinch from the slumping economy and
pushed for more control over lumber resources on their communally held land.93
Environmentalists recognized the widespread erosion, desertification, and ecological
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problems resulting from unchecked logging and called for more forest protection. At the
same time, logging corporations endeavored to turn a profit from Mexico’s trees. Thus,
many conflicting forest narratives appeared in the newspapers included in this sample,
rendering a lively national dialogue concerning the future of the nation’s trees and
forestry policy.
Mexico’s forests existed within a diversity of climates and ecosystems – from the
cool, dry, temperate conifer stands of northern and central Mexico to the hot, lowland
tropical rain forests in the southeast – and these different forests held a variety of
resources and logging-recovery capabilities. The drier northern forests included species
that had evolved within a periodic fire regime, and therefore were accustomed to regrowing every few decades. This made the ecosystem relatively adaptable to periodic
logging, provided the loggers replanted new trees after a felling. However, wildfires were
very rare in the tropical rain forest, so most tree species inhabiting them were not evolved
to grow well in large open spaces. Instead, the seedlings depended on the thick forest
canopy to protect them and their soil from the region’s frequent torrential rains. If a
tropical rain forest is clear cut, the soil is quickly washed away, leaving behind hardpan,
which only weeds can colonize. Erosion was a serious problem in Mexico’s tropical
regions, but due to the country’s mountainous terrain, even the temperate regions suffered
from the affliction wherever loggers failed to harvest responsibly.94
While severe erosion had afflicted some regions of Mexico since the sixteenth
century when Spanish colonialists leveled forests to fuel silver mines, forest destruction
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accelerated erosion under the political stability of Porfirio Díaz (1884-1911) and
increased further with the rise of industrialization throughout the twentieth century. By
1984, thirty percent of Mexico’s forests were seriously damaged from erosion with the
southeast in particularly bad shape – for instance, ninety percent of the state of Oaxaca
was eroded.95 Mexican newspaper articles from Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and
1984 addressed these issues, and presented an environmental discourse on how to best
obtain the wealth growing in the forests without further degrading the country’s
environment.
Reporters and their sources filled these two newspapers with a variety of forest
narratives, but upon close analysis, three general arguments emerge: valuable forest
resources were going to waste due to unsustainable harvesting; logging caused ecological
problems with detrimental impacts for humanity; and the federal government was
working to develop an environmentally-friendly, sustainable forest policy that would
benefit more Mexicans. In many stories these arguments overlapped. Articles that
focused on ecological damage due to frequent logging blamed unsustainable harvesting
for causing the problem, while articles that focused on the loss of forest products due to
unsustainable harvesting often noted the ecological damage that accompanied it.
Unsurprisingly, articles extolling government efforts to protect forests frequently cited
unsustainable harvesting and ecological damage as the reason the government needed to
take action in the first place. So while three separate arguments appear, they are in many
ways complimentary, with one providing evidence to support another.
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Although similarities exist between environmental reports on air pollution and
forestry, the rural quality of Mexico’s forests generated some key differences in the way
reporters told their stories. Similar to the trend noted with air pollution in chapter one,
government spokespeople and government-friendly journalists assured readers that the
federal government knew about the environmental problem, and was taking steps to
alleviate it. Likewise, as with air pollution, environmental journalists and their sources
targeted corporations and the federal government for causing the problems associated
with logging. However, there existed a vibrant discussion over what role campesinos
played in environmental destruction, and what role they should play in the future of the
forest industry. Therefore, forest narratives contained discussion over a particular rural
social group that was lacking in air pollution narratives discussing urban spaces
Mexicans viewed forests as critically important to the environmental health of the
nation, as well as vitally important to Mexico’s economic strength at a time when the
economy was struggling. Stories about the damage caused by logging focused on the
health of ecosystems, rather than the health of humans as did the stories about air
pollution. This fact makes it all the more surprising that among the sample of 216
environmental news stories in Excélsior and Uno Más Uno from 1983 and 1984,
reporters wrote more stories about rural forests than they did about urban air pollution in
the Valley of Mexico (which impacted eighteen million people).96 Environmental
reporters and their sources struggled to sort out the complex processes giving rise to the
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destruction of Mexico’s valuable forest resources even as they simultaneously tried to
catalogue the extent of the environmental damage and promulgate a sustainable forest use
policy. Their efforts educated readers, many of whom were urban and far removed from
the crisis, about the importance of using forest resources in a way that did not lead to
environmental crisis. The lack of consensus on a specific policy among the many
environmental narratives demonstrates the complexity of striking a balance between
environmental and economic concerns during a period of both environmental and
economic crisis.
The rest of this chapter contains three sections that support this argument. Section
one, “Irrational Forest Use,” examines stories from the many different types of sources
that attempted to describe forest-use in Mexico as irrational; this complex word
“irracional” best translates to “unsustainable” in this context, but exactly what irracional
meant changed from one story to the next. While government administrators frequently
used this word in referencing campesino subsistence logging, university biology
researchers used the same word to describe massive clear cutting by logging
corporations, and some reporters simply used it to describe poorly-regulated Mexican
forestry policy as a whole. Although the meaning of irracional varied, most of those
sources or reporters who used it for news stories attempted to describe the waste they saw
in it, and blamed those they thought responsible for its persistence. Section two,
“Logging and the Environment,” analyzes articles that focused on qualifying and
quantifying environmental damage caused by logging, and articles that celebrated efforts
to reverse this damage. Most of the stories in this section emphasized cataloguing
environmental damage in forests rather than discussing a balance between environmental
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and economic interests. Section three, “Government as the Solution to Irrational
Forestry,” considers the federal government’s messages concerning the development of a
national, rational forest-use policy, and examines what sort of promises they made and to
whom.
Irrational Forest Use
Throughout the 1980s, newspapers conveyed a sense of incredulity at the
rampant, often unregulated, destruction of Mexico’s forests, frequently using the phrases
“immoderate tree felling” (tala inmoderada) or “irrational exploitation” (explotación
irracional) to describe the complex factors that gave rise to this destruction, and
frequently called for “rational exploitation” (explotación racional) as a solution to
economic, social, and environmental problems. While these three phrases appeared often
in articles, there was no specific definition for them upon which all reporters could agree.
Many journalists (and sources) described the logging practices of corporations as tala
inmoderada or explotación irracional, while a smaller number blamed government
corruption, collusion, or disorganization for giving rise to irrational forest use.
Newspapers also discussed the role of the campesino in forest destruction, with some
authors blaming their tree-felling subsistence practices for preventing the implementation
of explotación racional while others exonerated the campesino in favor of blaming the
socio-economic system that encouraged their behavior. While opinions differed as to who
was at fault, the newspapers from this sample communicated to the reading public a
message that Mexico desperately needed a rational forest use policy that would both
bring the nation economic wealth and preserve the nation’s environmental wealth.
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In June 1984, Congress attempted to define and address the irrational use of
Mexico’s forests with a proposed reform to the Federal Forestry Law. Environmental
reporter Teresa Weiser covered the hearing for Uno Más Uno. She reported that
lawmakers viewed the forests as a source of great national wealth that was being wasted
due to poor policies, bad transportation networks, industrial overexploitation, and
campesino subsistence needs that required the felling of trees every few years to create
new agricultural plots. The Director of the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH), Horacio
García Aguilar, announced, “we want to introduce the concept of multiple use of the
forest and its rational exploitation,” which he later explained as establishing effective
systems of forest harvesting that would bring campesinos into the forest economy and
share the wealth with them.97 Interestingly, based on what Weiser wrote for the article,
the legislators devoted most of their speeches to explaining how bad everything was, but
left the specificities of their reform vague.98
Failing to specify forestry reforms was a common theme among proponents of
adopting a more rational forest use policy; rather than describing a plan to remedy the
situation, most sources merely described the problems. For example, the President of the
Environmental Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, Oscar Cantón Zetina, referred
to the Lancandon Jungle in the state of Chiapas to illustrate what irrational forest use
looked like, but failed to offer a solution: “The tropical forests have been sacked as if
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they were mines. One obvious example is the Lancandon Jungle, which fifteen years ago
was more than thirteen thousand square kilometers, now more than half has been
destroyed, and if this trend continues, in less than ten years all of the area will be
deforested.”99 By using the phrase, “sacked as if they were mines,” in describing the
destruction of the Lancandon, Zetina simultaneously conjured up images of both a
plundering army and the non-renewable mineral resources collected in the mining
industry. Such harvesting practices were irrational in the mind of Zetina, but aside from a
few vague references to campesinos harboring the solution, he failed to elucidate what a
rational forest use policy would look like.
National concern over the felling of tropical forests in Mexico’s southeast
corresponded with a growing international fear of biodiversity loss in the tropics
popularized in the 1980s, and most authors who wrote about this destruction placed the
blame on corporations.100 An unnamed reporter covering a SARH review about the state
of Quintana Roo, on the Yucatan Peninsula, noted, “more than one-hundred thousand
hectares of jungle have been razed in Quintana Roo due to the irrational exploitation of
companies like Industrialized Wood of Quintana Roo, which, by means of a twenty-nine
year concession extracted 580,000 cubic meters of precious wood, principally cedar and
mahogany.”101 The reporter expressed outrage at this loss, and was especially upset that
Industrialized Wood kept most of the profits while the campesinos who lived in the
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newly-ruined environment received a meager two-thousand peso annual income from
selling their rights to the forestland. The reporter felt that the campesinos’ ignorance and
poverty allowed Industrialized Wood to take advantage of them.
Carlos Duayhe, another reporter for Uno Más Uno, also blamed the callous ways
of industrial logging for simultaneously ruining the environment and impoverishing the
peasants with its “explotación incontrolada.” In a front page news story about the
deforestation and subsequent erosion problems in the southern state of Oaxaca, Duayhe
revealed that ninety percent of the state was eroded and ninety-three percent of the state’s
original forest had been logged in what he called “hit and run exploitation.”102 Duayhe
interviewed Rodolfo Ramírez, a researcher from the School of Biological Sciences at the
National Polytechnic Institute, who explained that “much of this damage comes from too
much desire for wealth, the greed of a few who felled trees and eroded soils; with the
exception of those who did it out of necessity.” Ramírez also lamented the loss of an
entire way of life due to industrial logging: “We have verified that the forest has been
destroyed, generally at the hands of companies. In this way, the land remains either
abandoned or at the disposal of its original owners and they make poor use of the soil.”103
Ramírez went on to lament the destruction of culture caused by this unsustainable
logging: “The people without technical capacity, the marginalized, abandoned indigenous
groups have totally forgotten that which their ancestors knew, this is the most sobering,
because in the trips that we have made to Oaxaca we have seen soils totally destroyed
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where pre-Hispanic remains of works are still seen of structures directed to impede
erosion, terraces, constructed about the slopes of the mountains; a culture almost
disappeared.”104 For Ramírez, the definition of irrational forest use was the actions of a
few industrial logging corporations who not only damaged the environment beyond
repair, but also endangered a rich historical tradition predating the arrival of the Spanish.
Reporters tried different approaches to bring irrational forest use into the national
spotlight. Whereas the examples noted so far were all longer news stories, Gustavo
Rodríguez filed a news brief for Uno Más Uno which noted the links between poor
forestry practices and erosion in the northern state of San Luis Potosí.105 This paragraphlong story was a useful way to quickly inform readers about the importance of good
forestry, without their having to invest the time it would take to read a full-feature story.
A common theme among the examples analyzed so far is their focus on specific
locations, but some reporters described irrational logging on a national scale, therefore
putting the entire country into the same dire straits. José Ignacio Navarro González, the
General Director of Soil and Water Conservation for SARH and a member of the
National Commission of Arid Zones, communicated this national crisis to an unnamed
reporter for Uno Más Uno, noting that “thirty percent of the nation’s forests and jungles,
that is some fifteen million hectares, has been greatly damaged by erosion caused by
immoderate felling (tala inmoderada) and negligence with respect to reforestation shown

104

Ibid.

105
Gustavo Rodríguez, "Erosionada, 50% de la superficie: UASLP," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City,
Mexico), May 12, 1984.

62
by logging companies.”106 While a story highlighting problems stemming from irrational
logging in Oaxaca may not have been of interest to a resident of Mexico City who had
never visited southeast Mexico, the same resident might have been stirred to action by a
story that described irrational forest use in Mexico as a whole. Different approaches
likely yielded different results for different readers; good reporters knew this and
diversified their reporting styles accordingly.
Reporters also described the actions of Mexicans opposed to irrational forest use.
This was the case in October 1983, when 1,700 people rose in protest in the state of
Jalisco to demand an end to current forestry practices. As reporter Eduardo Chimely
reported for Excélsior, “members of the Revolutionary Campesino Alliance demanded
that Governor Enrique Alvarez del Castillo prevent businesses and individuals from
exploiting 54,000 hectares of forest in the municipality of Cuautitlán, and demanded the
retirement of the Rural Police which has threatened them so they will abandon their
lands.”107 Chimely interviewed Aurelio Hernández, a commissary member of the
Ayotitán Ejido, who specifically named mayor Durán Legaspi and two logging
companies, Compañia Industrializadora and Cultivadora de Bosques, S.A., as the
primary perpetrators of the plundering. For these campesinos, government and corporate
figures conspired in the irrational forest use that left them impoverished and persecuted,
and publicly naming their persecutors was a way to fight back. Hernández argued that the
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campesinos were ready to form communal cooperatives to exploit forest resources, and
that this was the most rational way to convert trees to wealth.
When reporters for Excélsior and Uno Más Uno interviewed campesinos about
sustainability, the campesinos frequently explained irrational forest use as a by-product of
government and industry corruption. As noted above, campesinos in Jalisco demonstrated
against state and local government figures who they claimed were actively conspiring
with two logging companies to acquire what belonged to the campesinos, but an article
documenting the irrational logging of a forest in the Valley of Mexico known as
Magdalena Contreras made similar claims against the federal government. Once again,
representatives for these communal land holders named names in an attempt to bring
their nefarious actions to wider public attention: “the lack of a communal commission to
organize the exploitation of [the forest’s] resources, and the presence of ‘corrupt pseudoleaders’ like Rosendo Bautista and Auraliano Velazco, who traffic in communal lands,
are the most serious sources of conflict in this zone.”108 These sources went on to link
Bautista’s and Velazco’s corrupt activities with the paper factory Loreto y Peña Pobre to
whom they licensed the exploitation of the wood, the Federal Commission of Electricity
whom they permitted to clear forest in order to install power lines against the wishes of
the locals, and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform with whom they colluded to traffic in
communal lands.
That these accusations came from campesinos speaks to the contempt the rural
poor held for government accountability and egalitarianism, and the presence of such
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articles in two of Mexico’s major newspapers suggests that by 1984, some environmental
journalists were willing to listen to, and publish, the opinions of the poor, even
concerning issues as far-reaching as national forest use policy. Several weeks later, Alicia
Ortiz filed a story for Uno Más Uno with many of the same claims from campesino
spokespeople alleging links between government corruption and irrational forest use in
Magdalena Contreras. In addition to naming Rosendo Bautista and Loreto y Peña Pobre
as perpetrators of corrupt logging deals, Unión de Comuneros member Gabriel Juárez
accused the Ministry of Agrarian Reform of refusing to convene elections for legally
recognized communal representatives, thereby permitting the illegal exploitation of the
forest to continue. “Their lands will be set aside for the construction of houses for the
employees of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. There are very strong interests that cause
the civil servants to oppose the naming of representatives.”109 These examples implicated
the government as a direct player in the irrational logging of a popular recreation spot in
the Valley of Mexico.
Campesinos themselves were a popular topic in newspaper articles from this
sample discussing irrational forest use. While reporters and sources frequently accused
campesinos’ subsistence logging practices and communal land holdings of standing in the
way of rational forest development, reporters focused blame on the social and economic
structures of Mexico rather than the campesinos themselves. Raul Olmedo, the author
who wrote thirty-five editorials for the Excélsior series “Our Lost Forests,” devoted
several of them to discussing the relationship between campesinos and forestry. In “Our
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Lost Forests IV: A Benefit not Taken Advantage Of,” Olmedo quoted extensively from a
speech delivered by future President Carlos Salinas de Gortari delivered on December 3,
1981, while he was the director of the Institute of Political, Economic, and Social Studies,
in which he argued that it was unfair to blame campesinos for the rampant destruction of
Mexico’s forests. “We should accuse the socio-economic system of being irrational,
because it prevents the campesino from earning a sufficient salary with permanent
employment, and he has to resort to cutting trees and shepherding for survival.”110 For
Salinas de Gortari, the actions of campesinos did indeed amount to irrational forestry, but
rather than blame the individuals, he blamed the social and economic system that led
them to their destructive actions.
Raúl Correa, a reporter for Uno Más Uno, wrote a story about the “great
backwardness” in Mexico’s forestry sector, and once again the campesino played a
prominent role in the discussion. He interviewed León Jorge Castaños, the Forest
Undersecretary for SARH, to learn what was preventing the rational use of Mexico’s
forests. Jorge Castaños explained what he saw as one of the biggest problems, “in
Mexico, the country with the fourth largest oil reserves in the world, there are nearly four
million homes that use firewood to cook food; a vital factor in the deforestation of the
country.”111 The Forest Undersecretary blamed the actions of the campesinos for
contributing to irrational forest use, but he did not scold them for their behavior, rather,
he argued that they were merely victims of an inefficient system. The following week
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Correa wrote a story about deforestation, and discussed the connections between
economics, campesino subsistence, and the felling of trees. “Of every million inhabitants
that live in the forested areas (ten million in total) of the country, only 95,000 find
permanent employment in the exploitation of the resource. The economic revenue for the
rest depends, generally, on the gathering [of wood] and the felling [of trees] to
complement their subsistence.”112 Correa’s characterization of the campesino’s
relationship to the forest is yet another case in which the campesino is both blamed and
exonerated for the destruction of Mexico’s forests. In his opinion, the campesino was
indeed responsible for unsustainable logging, but poverty gave rise to this action rather
than greed or malice.
Raul Olmedo, and some of the sources from whom he quoted, found the nation’s
communal land system to blame for preventing a rational forest policy from being
implemented. Across the countryside, especially in central Mexico, villages owned much
of the landscape in common for the campesinos who lived there. This land ownership
pattern, known as the ejido system, provided land for agricultural use and small-scale
resource exploitation, but it made the large-scale transfer of land – and the forest
resources on it – more difficult to process than if the land were owned privately. For
Olmedo, such a system was terribly wasteful since technocrats could not direct a rational
harvest of trees. In an editorial for his “Our Lost Forests” series he wrote of the ejidos:
“In these areas live almost ten million campesinos that remain in the worst
marginalization, despite being possessors of the rights to a resource that under efficient

112
Raúl Correa, "400 mil has. de bosques y selvas mueren cada año," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City,
Mexico), Apr. 20, 1984.

67
forms of organization could be the basis of their development. When the campesino does
not see in the forest a source of permanent work that permits a life with dignity, he is
converted into an enemy to control.”113 The Director of Forestry Development for SARH,
Carlos Valdés Sandoval, agreed with Olmedo, “Land ownership in our country is
primarily ejidal and communal. If the campesinos themselves do not take over the
production of raw materials in an organized and productive manner, we cannot have
rational exploitation.”114
Campesinos had used forest resources for their subsistence for much of the
twentieth century, so rural communities held a strong belief in their right to these
resources in 1983 and 1984. A growing campesino population had been relying on
dwindling forests in some areas as early as the 1930s.115 Their traditional use of these
forests imbued many campesinos with the notion that these forest resources belonged to
them, to be used in whatever manner they saw fit. Therefore, policy analysts supporting
the privatization of ejido forest resources frequently presented narratives which
emphasized the ways in which this policy would benefit campesinos.
In a follow up editorial, Olmedo once again interviewed Sandoval, who claimed
to be working on a plan in which campesinos on ejidos could harvest their forests and
keep most of their wealth. He told Olmedo: “They [campesinos] should be the true
beneficiaries of the rational development of forest resources. The forest should be a factor
that contributes to the creation of a more egalitarian society. You need to consider that
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the forest should be in the service of humanity and the nation, and not for the usufruct of
a few.”116 While the Mexican Revolution had established the ejido system specifically to
benefit the nation’s campesinos, these articles demonstrate a shift in beliefs in the early
1980s among policymakers, who started to reframe ejidos as structures of
impoverishment.117 Therefore, although these articles discussed primarily forest policy,
they matched the perspective of Mexico’s contemporary technocrats and political elites,
who believed the ejido system needed to be modernized by allowing ejido members to
deal directly with outsiders for the exploitation of their lands.118
In all of these stories, newspaper reporters, government administrators, university
researchers, and campesinos endeavored to describe the irrational forest use they believed
to be happening across Mexico. Although opinions changed as to who was most
responsible for causing this unsustainable exploitation, all of these champions of rational
forestry viewed newspapers as a way to garner support for their causes. It was important
to them that their countrymen understand the processes and villains that threatened a
rational forest policy. The varying environmental narratives concerning forests suggests
that Mexicans who cared about forests (or the raw materials they contained) in 1983 and
1984 viewed the period as a time of crisis, and they used newspaper stories to spread a
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sense of urgency about the need to act to secure the future of Mexico’s trees and the
resources they represented.
Logging and the Environment
While some journalists discussed a rational forest use policy in the pages of
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, others focused on the environmental problems caused by
tala inmoderada and explotación irracional.119 Environmental journalists worked to
uncover links between irresponsible logging and some of the biggest environmental
problems Mexico faced in 1983 and 1984. The major issues on which they focused
included the impact of deforestation on rivers and groundwater, its connection to erosion,
its contribution to ecological degradation, and its impacts on air quality. While authors
lamented the loss of forests, they expressed equal passion in celebrating reforestation
campaigns, announcements for which frequently appeared in the newspaper. Among the
sources analyzed for this section, there was a good mix between urban and rural forests.
Mexico City had several forest reserves within and surrounding the city, and reporters
covered threats to these urban green spaces with vigor. The scale of deforestation was
much higher in rural areas, and through their articles, reporters notified urban readers
about forest exploitation in regions many may have never before seen. By explaining the
links between logging and environmental problems, environmental journalists helped
readers to understand the complexity of consequences arising from irrational logging.
By 1984, there were few forests remaining in the Valley of Mexico, so when
deforestation threatened the forest of Magdalena Contreras on the southwest rim of the
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valley, reporters explained to readers why the logging threatened more than just some
trees. In a story for Uno Más Uno, ejido representatives from Magdalena Contreras told
an unnamed reporter that “deforestation has caused the appearance of varieties of little
plants that consume great quantities of water. This in turn causes the springs to generate
less liquid for the river that provides water to the town of San Andrés and others of the
Magdalena [River].”120 The felling of trees would have simultaneously disrupted the soil
and provided more light for the surface, perfect conditions for both terrestrial and
aqueous invasive plants to gain a foothold. Using the newspaper, these ejido
representatives drew a direct connection between deforestation and a reduction of water
flow for villages along the Magdalena River. Two weeks later, reporter Alicia Ortiz
returned to Magdalena Contreras for Uno Más Uno and repeated this theme, explaining,
“The Magdalena River, which in past eras was two meters deep, is almost dry, and the
waters that do arrive are found totally contaminated with the organic wastes that are
poured into them.”121 While both of these stories focused primarily on blaming industrial
and government interests for irrational exploitation (as noted above), they also included
these important warnings about how logging can damage rivers. As a way to show
readers why deforestation should matter to them, Ortiz and these ejido representatives
described this relationship between logging and river flows as an example of what
happens to water supplies after unsustainable exploitation.
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Raul Olmedo devoted much of his column space to discussing the need for a
rational use of Mexico’s forests (as noted above), and he referenced hydrologic problems
resulting from irrational logging as an argument for changes to be made. In an evaluation
of the current forestry system, he noted environmental problems surrounding irrational
logging, explaining how “a lack of legal protection for large areas of forest vegetation has
contributed significantly to environmental pollution, the scarcity of water in periods of
low water, and floods in wet periods.”122 Olmedo placed his analysis of environmental
problems in between analyses of economic and social problems resulting from irrational
forest use. For him, environmental damage was merely another unfortunate consequence
of his nation’s inability to efficiently utilize its forest wealth.
Environmental journalists working for Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and
1984 also connected logging with erosion, a nationwide affliction that degraded
agricultural lands and forced campesinos to find other means of subsistence in order to
avoid poverty. As noted above, erosion was especially bad in Oaxaca, and reporter Carlos
Duayhe consulted an academic researching the region in order to contextualize the issue
for his readers. Rodolfo Ramírez, a researcher from the National Polytechnic Institute,
explained “the principal problem of Oaxaca is that the eroded soils do not retain water;
and once denuded, if the vegetative cover has been destroyed, the erosion is more violent,
because the rainfall is very abundant.”123 Alarmingly, Ramírez warned that the problem
was getting worse: “while the deterioration of Oaxaca dates back to Colonial [times], the
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truth is that the deterioration has accelerated in recent decades.”124 Duayhe and Ramírez
also discussed the unique problems that uncontrolled logging causes in tropical rain
forests, so that readers in the very different environment of Mexico City could understand
why deforestation in Oaxaca was much more serious than deforestation in temperate
regions.125 By simultaneously alerting readers about an environmental crisis in a state
more than 400 kilometers away, and explaining why its unique attributes rendered it more
vulnerable than other regions of Mexico, Duayhe clearly made an effort to convince
readers to confront a distant, unseen threat to their nation’s patrimony.
Mexico’s political leaders discussed some of these same threats in June 1984 as
they attempted to reform federal forestry policy, and reporter Teresa Weiser wrote up
parts of their discussion for Uno Más Uno. Oscar Cantón Zetina, the President of the
Environmental Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, argued that both erosion and
desertification were “grave phenomena” in Mexico, and that these crises seemed to have
reached “apocalyptic” levels.126 In this case, Zetina described the connection between
irrational logging and ongoing ecological crises to garner political support for a reform to
federal forestry policy. Weiser, in turn, used his quote in the newspaper, which, coming
from a government expert, lent an air of legitimacy to the links between logging, erosion,
and desertification that she was trying to establish.
Reporter Roberto Vizcaíno wrote a story about the impacts of the deforestation of
the Lancandon Jungle in Chiapas with dire warnings similar to those noted above, but he
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expounded on some of the other ecological damages to which the destruction of the rain
forest gave rise. Similar to Duayhe, Vizcaíno received his information from scientists
conducting research in the area, but in this case, two of three researchers were Americans
and one was Mexican. This demonstrates that Vizcaíno trusted foreign sources to
describe environmental issues in his country. In his story he wrote: “The denunciations
and efforts to rationalize the exploitation of the jungle have failed and with this Mexico
exchanged – say the researchers – ‘its treasure of vegetation and animal species for
livestock, utilities, and a desert of pasture.’…Quickly, they say, this will be a desert
because the layer of workable land is minimal and the crops will consume this final
wealth, which only served to sustain this impressive and rich jungle that already today no
longer exists.”127 Once again, the author drew upon scientific expertise to describe
environmental destruction occurring in a distant location in an attempt to raise awareness
about a problem with which urban readers most likely had no personal experience. If
Vizcaíno could not make his readers care, he could at least inform them of what was
happening to their country.
Alicia Ortiz wanted readers to know how deforestation impacted a forest much
closer to the heart of Mexico, the Magdalena Contreras growing along the mountains that
defined the Valley of Mexico. Claiming that commoners were selling off the forest to
paper mills because the Ministry of Agrarian Reform was in chaos, Ortiz’s source,
Gabriel Juárez, a member of the Union of Commoners, complained that “the forest fauna
had been practically eradicated” and also that “tourism, one of the principal sources of

127
Roberto Vizcaíno, "Más de 100 años de brutal explotación en la lacandona," Uno Más Uno
(Mexico City, Mexico), Apr. 20, 1984.

74
employment in the area of Los Dínamos, had decreased notably.”128 While most of the
stories that expressed concern over logging cited links to diminished water supplies,
erosion, or desertification (things that impacted humanity), Ortiz and Vizcaíno represent
a smaller, but important group of reporters lamenting the loss of biodiversity due to
logging. These two examples demonstrate that there was a contingent of reporters
arguing on behalf of those species who could not speak against unchecked logging for
themselves.
As noted in chapter one, reports about air pollution frequently noted the links
between trees and better air quality and, unsurprisingly, stories focusing on deforestation
also made this link. In a story for Excélsior reporting on a protest over unregulated
logging at the Desierto de los Leones park in Mexico City, members of the Coyoacán
Environmental Association demanded that President Miguel de la Madrid put a stop to
the destruction of “the most important ‘lung’ of the Valley of Mexico.”129 Many forest
advocates around Mexico City called forested areas lungs, a reference to the ability of
trees to remove pollutants from the air, thereby generating cleaner air for the city. These
protestors clearly saw the link between poor air quality and deforestation, and wanted
their fellow citizens to see it too.
Fernando Césarman also saw this link, and used his editorial column in Uno Más
Uno to spread the news. In it, he lamented humanity’s unwillingness to protect the
planet’s forests: “We find ourselves in a process of destruction of the forests, which are
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the sites where oxygen is processed, where the air is recycled which is indispensible for
breathing. According to the experts, by the year 2000 the planet’s forested area will be
reduced by one-tenth. The ecological vision of the future is pessimistic because all the
projections are negative. To be able to continue with life, our conduct toward nature must
change radically.”130 While addressing Mexico’s forestry problems was a big enough
problem for most Mexican forest advocates in the 1980s, Césarman adopted a global
perspective, and encouraged Mexicans to think the same way.
While Césarman’s dire warnings may have come off as depressing, many stories
reported reforestation campaigns across Mexico as events to be celebrated. Excélsior
reported in October 1983 that SEDUE had launched a program to plant trees along a
forty-five kilometer stretch of highway in the state of Puebla. The author noted that the
effort will “recuperate areas damaged by pollution, as well as the soils, [it will] protect
the roads from washouts, diminish noise and permit the recharging of aquifers in
agricultural areas.”131 Many of these notifications appeared in the newspapers in news
brief form, more like announcements than actual stories. Such stories included the
planting of 2,000 trees in the tourist district of North Beach in Playa del Carmen, 500,000
trees in Iztacalco, 50,000 trees in the Desierto de los Leones, 30,000 shrubs in Santa
Cecilia Tepetlapa to celebrate the Day of the Tree, and an investment by the Iztapalapa
delegation of 107 million pesos to reforest riparian areas and road medians in
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Iztapalapa.132 The sheer number of these types of stories suggests that Mexican readers
liked reading about the planting of trees, and that the local or federal governments
undertaking the reforestation campaigns used newspapers to promote them.
Environmental reporters, government administrators, and university researchers
contributed forest narratives describing links between deforestation and environmental
damage extending beyond the obvious loss of trees. By explaining to readers problems
like the loss of water resources, erosion, reduced ecosystem diversity, and increased air
pollution, these environmental advocates urged their fellow citizens to value the forest
rather than the trees. Likewise, stories describing reforestation activity established links
between forests and environmental renewal. And as the following section argues, some
government-friendly reporters frequently promoted the government as the organization
leading the charge for environmental solutions.
Government as the Solution to Irrational Forestry
Mexico’s federal government also contributed to the national conversation
unfolding in the newspapers concerning the fate of Mexico’s forests, with PRI
spokespeople consistently promoting the idea that the solution resided within official
government channels. Furthermore, the De la Madrid administration cultivated a
paternalistic, peasant-friendly image that claimed Mexico’s forests could simultaneously
lift campesinos out of poverty through rational harvesting and still be safeguarded against
environmental destruction. This response resonates with that of government reactions to
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air pollution, which also promoted the federal government as the environmentallyfriendly arbiter, a champion of clean air. However, the government’s effort to explain the
privatization of ejido-owned forests as an environmentally driven decision – rather than a
revenue-generating measure consistent with the neoliberal turn – assumed a degree of
deception not seen in its campaign to persuade Mexicans that it was improving air
quality.
Convincing Mexicans that the federal government could prevent future irrational
logging was one narrative used to establish government environmental credibility. A
report issued in 1984 by León Jorge Castaño, the Forest Undersecretary for SARH,
warned that more land was deforested in 1983 than in any other year of Mexico’s history.
Despite the grim news, Jorge Castaño explained that Mexicans need not worry because,
“that which occurred last year would not happen again, since one billion pesos will be
allocated from the federal budget…in order to prevent these problems.”133 Jorge Castaño
did not reveal the details of how this money would translate into forest protection, he
simply noted that since the federal government was throwing money at the problem, the
issue would be resolved.
A similar narrative came from a different administrator at SARH when asked
about the threat erosion posed to Mexican forests. José Ignacio Navarro González, the
General Director of Soil and Water Conservation, explained that previous government
policies failed to address soil conservation in logged regions, but now the federal
government “has allocated six billion pesos to the conservation of soil and water and two
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billion more to the rehabilitation of arid regions.”134 Once again, the government
spokesman failed to specify how this money would be utilized in the fight against
logging-induced environmental degradation, but he assured the reader that federal money
would solve the problem.
While the previous examples were vague, SARH provided a more detailed
description of a rational forest use plan in Quintana Roo, describing their Pilot Forest
Program as a solution to illegal logging both from campesinos and corporations. After
describing the destruction of tropical forests in Quintana Roo over the last thirty years, an
unnamed reporter for Uno Más Uno explained that the Pilot Forest Program “aims to end
irregularities in the concessioning of forest areas and in the monitoring and surveillance
of activities.”135 Furthermore, the program “had incorporated ten thousand campesinos
from eleven ejidos” who would be instructed in rational forest use for the harvest of
“mahogany, cedar, and twelve other forest species considered common.”136 In other
words, not only was the federal government going to prevent future ecological damage in
this already environmentally degraded state, but it would also instruct campesinos in how
to sustainably harvest their forests so that they could continue to generate wealth from
them for years to come. Implicit in this plan was the idea that dry tropical forests could be
sustainably logged at all, a dubious notion considering the physiographical characteristics
of the jungle. In any case, this story clearly presented the future of logging in Quintana
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Roo as a win-win scenario, aiming to please both environmentalists and those concerned
with social justice. In fact, the only losers in this article were the logging corporations,
who were now going to face more oversight from SARH.
While government spokespeople promoted cash infusions and increased
government oversight for forest crisis management, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno also
communicated the federal government’s forest privatization plan as the key to a rational,
environmentally-friendly forest policy. In 1986, the Federal Government introduced a
new forestry code that authorized ejidos to consult private logging firms to harvest their
trees, rather than forcing them to go through the Mexican National Forest Service as they
had in the past.137 The idea of transferring more control to campesinos appeared in a
Congressional discussion (and a newspaper article covering it) two years prior,
intermingled with visions of ecological sensitivity: “We want to introduce the concept of
multiple use forests and their rational exploitation, in order to avoid such strict closures,
that were established politically in the actual law, that are conducive to forest
destruction.”138 This statement, made by Horacio García Aguilar, the director of SARH,
argued that forest service regulations that limited campesino forest use (such as forest
closures that prevented harvesting) actually encouraged forest destruction, and that more
campesino control would give rise to more responsible forest management among the
peasants who owned the forests.
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García Aguilar went on to tie the future of rational forest management to more
campesino input, claiming, “the results of these formal consultation meetings on
environmental legislation should be fully complemented by meetings with authentic
campesino organizations across the country.”139 Although the specifics of the forestry
reform being discussed at this congressional hearing in 1984 were not revealed in the
article, a clear link exists between the themes under discussion and the 1986 forestry law
giving campesinos the power to deal with private corporations. Therefore, this
progression of increasing campesino agency regarding forestry decisions dovetails into
the forestry privatization efforts introduced in 1986 as President De la Madrid’s
administration embraced neoliberal reforms in an attempt to reduce government costs.
A follow-up story written a week later (also by Teresa Weiser) revealed some of
the details of the proposed reforms to the forestry law, and once again, a government
spokesperson couched increased privatization and campesino control as the
environmentally conscious decision. León Jorge Castaños, the Forest Undersecretary for
SARH, explained that the reforms to the forestry law “anticipate that the technical studies
for the use of forest resources may be developed by SARH personnel, but also by
professionals or by the owners or possessors of the resource, provided they have proof of
an evaluation of its exploitable capacity.”140 In other words, the law would make it easier
for campesinos to contract private logging corporations to harvest their forest resources.
Jorge Castaños continued with an assurance that SARH would also address “forest
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vigilance” in the new law: “state and local governments should contribute, regarding
audits, environmental strategy and the assessment of results in the ecological efforts.”141
The reform essentially delegated environmental oversight to local and state governments,
further reducing federal expenditures. While Jorge Castaños argued that these reforms
would provide for environmental protection, in reality many municipal and state
government budgets were ill-equipped to handle the extra expenditures.142 As a result,
neoliberal decentralization policies like this one turned out to be a net loss for the quality
of Mexico’s environment. Nevertheless, these articles demonstrate that government
administrators presented forestry reform as a way to safeguard the environment while
simultaneously enriching the poor.143
These articles from Excélsior and Uno Más Uno demonstrate that in 1983 and
1984 the federal government’s longstanding complex relationship with forests was
becoming even stranger. Its desire for neoliberal land reforms clashed with the PRI’s
traditional patrimonial role as protector of the forests, and so a contradictory message of
environmentally-friendly privatization appeared as a way to wed the PRI’s patrimonial
past with its neoliberal future. So the government’s environmental narrative promoted its
handing over of forests to local power brokers as the right choice for the environment and
the campesino. Administrators also promoted federal financial investments into forest
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protection programs, like the Pilot Forest Program in Quintana Roo, to boost its
credibility as champion of the forest.
In the sample analyzed for this thesis, reporters wrote stories about forests more
frequently than any other topic besides water crises, and the quantity of these stories
suggests that Excélsior and Uno Más Uno directors thought readers wanted to read them.
This belief permitted a diverse discourse of environmental narratives concerning forests.
Environmentalists, represented in newspapers by journalists, researchers, and
campesinos, contributed forest narratives which tried to make the case that deforestation
was out of control and the negative impacts associated with it damaged both economic
prosperity and ecosystems. Wise-use conservationists, such as Raul Olmedo, and federal
government administrators, argued that Mexico’s forests held valuable resources that
could be exploited in a way that was sustainable or racional. Furthermore, they argued
that the ejido land-holding system prevented sustainable use, and that the privatization of
forest resources could better contribute to the national economy while also lifting
campesinos out of poverty and providing better environmental protection of forests. Both
sides connected the future of forests to the future of Mexico in a visceral manner, and
promoted their particular philosophy as the best path forward.
While it is difficult to quantify the impact these narratives had on the
development of Mexico’s forest policy, and on efforts to protect forest environments, it is
possible to suggest some of its effects. By consistently reporting on issues like
deforestation, corporate and government collusion to log forests illegally, and the proper
role of the campesino in forest management, environmental journalists kept the pressure
on government administrators to address the destruction of the nation’s forests. At the
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same time, government spokespeople used newspapers to persuade readers that
permitting campesinos to deal directly with private forest managers and companies was
the correct way to address these very issues.
Today, forest destruction continues apace as the Federal Government’s
decentralization of forest management cleared the way for logging by drug cartels and
environmentalists from all social classes continue to fight against illegal logging.144
Although the federal government succeeded in passing its forest reforms, the economic
crisis limited its ability to fully fund campesino community forestry programs. So while
environmental reporting did not prevent unsustainable deforestation, it did raise
awareness among Mexicans about the dangers of disrupting an environment, even if it
was far away from where most people lived. In the next chapter we will explore the
environmental narrative of a much more tangible resource for the people of Mexico:
water.
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CHAPTER 3

“The Neglect is Criminal:” Water Crises and Environmental Reporting
Life was already challenging for the residents of Los Reyes Iztacala neighborhood
in Tlalnepantla (located in the Valley of Mexico), many of whom lived outside – either
under the branches of the local pirul trees or in dwellings along the railroad tracks
constructed from whatever could be scrounged – but the persistent inundations of
industrial wastewater and city sewage into their living spaces proved to be the breaking
point in the summer of 1983. The frequent downpours of the wet season overwhelmed
the city’s sewer system, and the excess water not only flooded out these squatters, it also
contaminated the drinking water of 125,000 people in Los Reyes. Tired of the persistent
inundations and fearful of an epidemic, residents turned to their local grassroots
organization, the Board of Citizen Participation, to appeal to Alfonso Olvera Reyes, their
mayor, to stop the flooding. In response, residents claimed, Olvera Reyes hired shock
brigades (brigadas de choque) to make death threats in an effort to shut them up. With
nowhere else to turn, the Board of Citizen Participation took their story to Excélsior. On
5 September, 1983, Mexicans across the country could read the tale of corruption and
neglect centered around water pollution, subtitled “The neglect is criminal.”145
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Journalists wrote more stories about water than any other environmental topic,
and the geographic scope of these stories encompassed every region of Mexico.146 Based
on the sheer number of stories reporting on events which jeopardized the purity or supply
of water, it is clear that environmental journalists viewed water crises as some of
Mexico’s most pressing environmental issues, and that Excélsior and Uno Más Uno
directors believed these issues to be popular among readers. Journalists served as public
educators by informing readers of threats to their health and quality of life caused by
water crises. Furthermore, they served as public watchdogs by blaming water crises on
those entities they believed responsible for causing them. At the same time, government
spokespeople and government-friendly journalists crafted narratives which served to
defend the federal government and convince the public that it was working to mitigate the
numerous water crises across the country.
Just like with air pollution, then, news stories from this sample demonstrate that
most reporters covering water crises served as public watchdogs and educators, but about
twenty percent of these environmental narratives worked to deflect criticism aimed at the
federal government and to promote policies supported by the PRI. The first section
analyzes narratives fitting the educator role used by environmentalists to link water
pollution or water shortages with unpleasant phenomena, such as illness or a reduced
quality of life. By drawing these connections and explaining the proximate causes behind
water crises, they hoped to educate readers about what they saw as an acute national

146

Of the 216 newspaper articles published in Excélsior and Uno Más Uno from 1983, and 1984
researched for this thesis, sixty-two focused on water issues, which means that nearly thirty percent of the
environmental reports from this sample dealt with problems surrounding water usage. Forests (twenty
percent) and air pollution (thirteen percent) rounded out the top three most reported-on environmental
issues. See Table 1 in the Appendix.

86
crisis – the security of their water. The next section analyzes narratives fitting the
watchdog role, in which reporters and their sources blamed some entity for causing a
water crisis. In blaming someone, the denouncer aimed to focus public anger onto
specific groups of people, either to encourage action against them or to deflect anger
away from oneself. The final section analyzes narratives which defended the federal
government’s handling of water crises.147 These stories promoted the government as the
champion of the people, and tried to convince readers that government administrators
were the best route for the redress of environmental water crises.
Describing Mexico’s Water Problems
While most readers likely understood that water pollution and water shortages
could have negative impacts on their lives, environmental journalists endeavored to
describe in detail the litany of maladies brought about by a compromised water supply.
Chief among them was the increase in disease caused by contaminated water, but
journalists also described the loss of revenue driven by dwindling aquifers, and garbagefilled tourist areas. Other journalists described how water pollution threatened nonhuman species. Taken as a whole, the description of Mexico’s many water crises by
environmental journalists demonstrates an attempt not just to educate, but also to
advocate for environmental responsibility.
Outbreaks of gastrointestinal diseases were frequent across the country, and
journalists filed many stories documenting these epidemics and linking them with water
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pollution from sewage or industrial wastewater.148 Reporter Gustavo Rodríguez consulted
representatives from Project Green (Proyecto Verde), a non-governmental environmental
organization, to connect an outbreak of skin and gastrointestinal diseases in the San Luis
Potosí community of Rascón with the industrial wastes flowing through the city’s main
drinking water canal.149 Similarly, reporter Joaquín Paredes relied on the medical
expertise of Dr. Raymundo Verduzco Rossan to link an outbreak of salmonella in
Saltillo, Coahuila, with vegetables irrigated with sewage from two local industries,
Zincamex and Cibiosa.150 On August 4, 1983, Maximino Rodríguez filed a story about
how a shipwreck loaded with spoiled tuna and sardines contaminated the Gulf of
California, causing those who caught fish in the vicinity of the shipwreck to get sick.151
These three examples demonstrate the variety of ways in which contaminated water
sickened Mexicans (either directly from the canal, by washing vegetables with
contaminated water, or by leaving spoiled food in a shallow sea near a city), but they also
show how reporters educated their readers of the wide-ranging circumstances by which
polluted water could find its way inside their bodies.
Polluted water also found its way across the country. Thanks to a man-made
drainage canal, the raw sewage from thirteen million people living in the Valley of
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Mexico drained to the Gulf of Mexico via Hidalgo, and reporter Rodolfo Wong wrote a
story about how this export of waste impacted the small town of Mixtiahuala, Hidalgo.
He interviewed Rafael Aguirre, an ejido member who told him that decades of Valley of
Mexico waste had saturated the soil and drinking water, and explained that “many
children come to bathe in this place [the Tula River, the primary drainage for the Valley
of Mexico], because of that we fear epidemics of skin and gastrointestinal illnesses. [We]
have also recorded isolated deaths.”152 Wong’s story encouraged Valley of Mexico
residents think about the consequences of not properly treating the city’s waste.
Other reporters educated the public about water pollution through shorter news
briefs. Usually no longer than a paragraph, these quick descriptions gave readers the
basic information about a problem without requiring the longer investment of time
needed to read a full story. Reporter Alfredo Ibarra wrote a news brief in September 1983
about an outbreak of typhoid and other gastrointestinal illnesses in Cuernavaca, Morelos,
in which 90,000 people, sixty percent of the city’s population, were ill. Although the
story was short, he made sure to note that doctors blamed the epidemic on the
contamination of drinking water due to the deterioration of the city’s water pipes.153 In
May 1984, 11,627 people, most of whom were children, suffered from gastroenteritis in
Guerrero due in part to contaminated water. Reporter Salomón García filed the news
brief, noting that nine cities (Acapulco, Chilpancingo, Taxco, Iguala, Huitzuco,
Zihuatanejo, Tlapa, Chilapa, and Ciudad Altamirano) reported instances of the
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epidemic.154 Another news brief in that same month warned residents of Naucalpan,
Atizapán, and Tlalnepantla (the city where residents of Los Reyes neighborhood faced
death threats from their mayor) that eight polluted streams in the northwestern Valley of
Mexico threatened to spark epidemics of infectious diseases due to their high levels of
pollution.155 With concise stories like these, reporters kept the dangers of water pollution
on the radar for time-pressed readers.
Unfortunately for Mexicans, organic pollutants were not the only water-borne
threats. Environmental journalists in this sample also wrote stories about the risks posed
by industrial chemicals like lead, chromium, or mercury, and communicated to readers
just how deadly they could be. Two environmental reporters, Teresa Weiser and Jesús
Lastra, teamed up for a pair of stories covering what they called an “environmental
disaster” in the Coatzacoalcos River in Veracruz in April 1984. They explained that the
river was contaminated with hydrocarbons, lead, mercury, cyanide, ammonia, detergents,
fecal residue, and gypsum, resulting in great health risks for those who drank or ate
anything from it.156 In the second story they focused on lead in the blood of citizens of
Coatzacoalcos, of which over half had elevated levels. The reporters interviewed medical
doctor Aura Judith Pérez Zapata, who explained that lead in the blood “produces a high
number of miscarriages, as well as weakness, [and] physiological deformations. Also, it
has been confirmed that it affects the central nervous system, the cerebellum, the spinal
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cord, and motor and sensory nerves.”157 After listing these terrifying lead poisoning
maladies, Weiser and Lastra revealed that a recent biochemical analysis found that fortythree percent of the species in the Coatzacoalcos River tested positive for lead. The
alarming tone of their article encouraged Coatzacoalcans to fear their own rivers. Such
was the power of descriptive environmental reporting.
Several reporters educated readers about the tendency for industrial wastewater
problems to spring up along the margins of the country. One reporter for Excélsior
focused on the oceans, noting the pollution problem from industries, cities, and even
tourism. This unnamed reporter interviewed José Luis Calderón Bertheneuf, the Director
of Water Pollution Control and Prevention for SEDUE, who explained that lead and
mercury flowing in Mexico’s rivers changed the characteristics of the ocean and the
creatures who lived in it.158 Reporter Fausto Fernandez Ponte wrote a story about the
dangers posed by maquiladoras along the United States border. Based on a study
conducted by researchers from the College of Mexico in Tijuana, Baja California, the
article described how these poorly regulated industrial complexes dumped very
dangerous toxic wastes into rivers along the border. Fernandez Ponte noted that some of
these chemicals were known to cause cancer.159 Both of these articles demonstrated a
desire to bring attention to the nation’s frontiers, and made a special point to describe the
difficulties of regulating toxic pollution in regions far from the capital.
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While some regions suffered from disproportionate water pollution due to their
remoteness, some social groups suffered undue water pollution because of their low
status in society, and environmental journalists educated readers of their plight. In an
exposé, reporter Mario García Sordo described cases of intoxication from pesticides in
the water supply among migrant workers in the Culiacán Valley of Sinaloa.160 In the
article Sordo wrote that the workers “suffer from poisonings because the employers deny
them potable water and they must resort to the canals in order to satisfy their basic needs.
It is precisely the water of the irrigation canals that carries the toxic waste from the
various pesticides that come together to cause serious harm to humans…In the canals
they wash their children, their dishes, and their clothes, and they also go to the canals to
fill up their pails of drinking water.”161 This was not a water issue that directly impacted
most readers. Instead, García Sordo’s report documented for his readers the exploitation
of their fellow citizens, living on the margins of society.
Describing illnesses or epidemics was not the only method environmental
journalists undertook to educate their readers about water crises, they also reported on
water problems that reduced Mexicans’ quality of life. Foremost among this approach
were stories warning of dwindling water supplies across the country. Just as Mexico City
exported its sewage to other regions of the country (as we saw in the case of Mixtiahuala,
Hidalgo), it also imported clean water (essentially exporting water shortages to the Lerma
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and Cutzamala basins) to satisfy the thirst of the valley’s eighteen million residents,
whose aquifer continued to dwindle throughout the decade.162
At the same time, reporters writing about the arid northwest raised concerns over
the aquifer’s ability to recharge the debt incurred by thirsty cities and irrigation demands.
Javier Cruz wrote a story about the overexploitation of groundwater in Ensenada, Baja
California, and quoted the Director of the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH) who blamed
the problem on campesinos drilling too many wells.163 This theme, in which the
government blamed poorly-managed environmental exploitation on ignorant peasants,
mirrors the case of irrational forest use by campesinos seen in chapter two. Elviro Muro
H. interviewed a geologist from National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM),
Mario Cabra Pérez, who described the nationwide water shortages found in Hermosillo,
Sonora, Baja California, and Mexico City, and suggested a ban on the drilling of new
water wells.164 Joaquín Paredes also raised concerns over the loss of water in a news brief
explaining that every day, forty percent of Saltillo, Coahuila’s water was lost due to
overexploitation, lack of system maintenance, and illegal well drilling.165 In this case, the
government shared the blame with the campesinos for wasting water. All of these stories
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projected a foreboding tone, suggesting that without water, economies, societies, and
lifestyles would change for the worse.
While some reporters fretted over dwindling aquifers, Marta Anaya lamented the
loss of scenic beauty among the canals of Xochimilco, one of Mexico’s most popular
tourist destinations. In a report filed for Excélsior, Anaya described the abundance of
garbage and aquatic weeds “that have become the companions” of the canals. Describing
her boat trip through Xochimilco she wrote,” and so one sees it coming [the water],
carrying trash. Gradually the boats go by. They navigate between a kind of green cream,
which floats the backwaters.”166 Describing her trip as a kind of expedition, Anaya
juxtaposed the common narrative of an explorer journeying through a natural place with
the unappealing qualities of a garbage dump. This perverted excursion highlighted the
disparity between what once existed, and the realities of the present, projecting a great
sense of loss to the reader.
Even though the environmental threats to humans were many, some reporters
devoted newsprint to educating readers of the dangers water pollution posed to nonhuman species. José Castañeda Carrillo, the president of a fishing cooperative near La
Vega dam in Jalisco complained to reporter Eduardo Chimely that wastewater from a
local sugar refinery threatened fish in the river.167 Similarly, representatives from Project
Green in the Huasteca region of San Luis Potosí told reporter Gustavo Rodríguez that
they found genetic mutations in animals living in local rivers. Since the early twentieth
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century this region had experienced repeated oil spills due to poorly regulated drilling. 168
Gustavo Rodríguez explained the danger this legacy posed to local fauna, and noted the
special peril they encountered with the excessively polluted Valles River: “Any animal
that drinks water in this area dies instantly due to the high degree of acid, oil, lye, and
other toxic substances in the river.”169 While the report noted the dangers this river posed
to people, that it also expressed concern for the ecosystem demonstrates that reporters
tried to educate readers about threats that did not directly impact their health.
In addition to educating readers about lacustrine and riparian life, reporters from
this sample also raised red flags over the threats posed to marine life. Javier Cruz filed
two stories in September 1983 about water pollution off the coast of Baja California. The
features dealt with a loss of marine life due to industrial waste from both the United
States and Mexico. The first story noted how the California current carried chromium,
lead, and pesticides from California south to the coast of Baja California where it
damaged fish populations.170 The following week Cruz wrote a story describing a
fourteen hectare dead zone in the Bay of Todos los Santos in Ensenada, Baja California,
due to the city’s industrial waste.171 Teresa Weiser, covering the National Environmental
Congress in May 1984, relayed the environmental discussions of the nation’s power
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brokers who viewed desertification and the pollution of Mexico’s rivers and seas as the
most challenging problems. But despite the focus on these issues, Weiser still found room
to mention the launch of a campaign of awareness to protect endangered species such as
the sea turtle.172 At a time when the nation’s economy was flagging and millions lived in
poverty, these issues might have been ignored. But Mexican journalists demonstrated an
empathy for wildlife, and described water crises from the animals’ point of view,
simultaneously educating their readers about what they were losing with this reduced
quality of life.
Affixing Blame for Water Crises
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno reporters in 1983 and 1984 also served as public
watchdogs, affixing blame for environmental water crises upon a host of guilty parties
ranging all across the social spectrum. Environmental journalists challenged the rhetoric
of industrial corporations and federal, state, and local governments, suggesting that
problems with the nation’s water supply stemmed from their collective apathy and
incompetence. Less frequent accusations named foreign governments for bringing
pollution to Mexico, and the Mexican people as a whole for lacking an environmental
conscience.173 Just as describing water crises in terms of their proximate causes and
deleterious impacts helped readers to understand the science behind the natural forces
that threatened their health or livelihoods, naming the people whose actions caused water
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crises empowered readers. Once people know who is threatening their water supply, they
can choose to demonstrate against them. By naming those parties they believed to be
guilty, environmental journalists and their sources attempted to turn readers against these
parties, thereby sharing with them the onus of civic action.
More often than not, if a reporter or source blamed industrial callousness for
provoking a water crisis, they would name the specific corporation or plant causing the
problem. In a story about industrial pollution in the Blanco River, Teresa Weiser wrote:
“With a high content of organic and solid material, the industrial waste within the Blanco
River watershed not only wreaks environmental havoc in the region, but also continually
deposits sediment in the hydroelectric plants installed along the river, which reduces the
capacity of the dams and deteriorates the equipment used in the production of energy.”174
She then named the Moctezuma Brewery, the Kimberly-Clark paper mill, and two
chemical companies called Proquina and Mexicana de Alcaloides as the largest
contributors of pollution to the river. In a news story written by Roberto Sosa, a small
town mayor accused a glass manufacturer of damaging the city’s aquifer. Victor López
Nassar explained to Sosa that Materias Primas de Monterrey had done irreparable harm
to their drinking water, but only paid the city two and a half pesos for every ton of
material it removed.175 The mayor told Sosa that they had requested an intervention into
the matter by the state government. Both of these examples demonstrate a willingness to
point fingers at specific corporations. As we saw in chapter one, Weiser was not shy
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about naming those she believed guilty for polluting the atmosphere, so it is not
surprising that she used this tactic in shaming polluters of the hydrosphere as well. López
Nassar, in his efforts to secure state intervention against Materias Primas, likely used the
newspaper as a way to generate public outcry against the glass manufacturer. In both
cases, the strategy of blaming specific industries in the newspaper was meant to initiate
processes that would end the pollution.
Accusations against industrial polluters indicate a concerted effort by journalists
to bring national attention to flagrant violations of environmental law, and the resulting
risks to human health. When water pollution damaged 5,000 hectares of ejido land in
Jalisco in August 1983, members of the local agricultural committee contributed a
narrative which publicly denounced the mining company Peña Colorada for dumping
mineral wastes into the Maravasco River.176 When an outbreak of salmonella hit Saltillo,
Coahuila, in September 1983, medical doctor Raymundo Verduzco Rossan used the
newspaper to urge authorities to punish two Mexican businesses, Zincamex and Cibiosa,
for releasing their sewage into the city’s irrigation water.177 In April 1984, Teresa Weiser
and Jesús Lastra filed an exposé on the ecological damage in the Coatzacoalcos River
near Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, blaming Pemex for dumping hydrocarbons and oil and
Fertimex for discharging high quantities of calcium and acid directly into the river.178
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While it is hard to know quantitatively how much these kinds of public
accusations translated into civic action, the number of people demonstrating for
environmental causes increased as the decade continued. Jordi Díez and several other
historians and political scientists have suggested that high profile environmental disasters
such as the 1984 San Juan Ixhuatepec gas explosion, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake,
and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster served as rallying points around which
environmentalist causes could grow.179 But by covering these demonstrations, reporters
gave rise to a positive feedback loop in which more stories about environmental
demonstrations gave rise to more environmental demonstration participation as citizens
learned what their countrymen were doing.
A pair of stories written by reporter Gustavo Rodríguez in May 1984 provides
evidence for this relationship between environmental stories and environmental
demonstrations. His news brief from May 18 described plans for a demonstration led by
environmental group Project Green (Proyecto Verde) against a Mexican business called
Fibracel and six other sugar refineries along the Valles River in San Luis Potosí.180 While
the group spokesman Pedro Medellín estimated they would see a turnout of about 10,000
people at the demonstration, Rodríguez’s news brief from two days later covering the
demonstration noted that more than 12,500 people showed up. The group held a symbolic
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closure of Fibracel, and Project Green called on SEDUE to prevent future pollution.181
While an increased attendance of 2,500 demonstrators is not overwhelming evidence that
the newspaper brought more people to the protest, it was still a twenty-five percent
increase over what they expected to receive.
Denouncements of the government for creating water crises were just as popular
as denouncements of industries among environmental journalists serving as public
watchdogs. Some claimed the government was itself degrading the environment, others
accused the government of failing to enforce environmental laws, and still others accused
the government of failing to establish adequate environmental protection policies. As
noted in the introduction to this chapter with the sewage problems in Los Reyes
neighborhood, sometimes Mexicans could not count on the government to redress their
water issues. But by taking their plight to the newspaper, citizens could apply pressure on
government administrators that they would not otherwise have been able to muster. At
the same time, journalists with an environmental orientation worked to apply this same
pressure to generate the environmental action they wished to bring about.
Most of the stories that accused the government of actively contributing to water
pollution were directed at nationalized industries, such as Pemex. In September 1983,
Mario Ruiz R. described the many measures Pemex had taken to reduce its environmental
footprint in the Coatzacoalcos River and the Gulf of Mexico, but explained that the
nationalized oil refinery in Coatzacoalcos still discharged its waste into the region’s
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water.182 In this case, the reporter softened the blow by describing Pemex’s
environmental investment, but still accused it of damaging a water supply. By mentioning
the government’s efforts to rehabilitate the environment, Ruiz described a government
working to mitigate a difficult crisis. In July 1984, the mayor of Salina Cruz, Oaxaca,
Jorge Camacho Cabrera, also lobbed accusations of environmental contamination at
Pemex. Camacho Cabrera claimed that Pemex did not have “adequate equipment for
preventing pollution, plus it did not inform anyone about a spill of 300,000 liters of diesel
that caused environmental damage in the vicinity of the town and the beaches.”183 In this
case, a local government administrator accused a higher branch of government for
causing a water crisis that affected his city. Camacho Cabrera and Ruiz worked together
through newsprint to apply pressure to the government hoping for an end to the pollution.
The most prevalent form of government criticism concerning water crises in this
sample consisted of accusing the government of failing to enforce environmental laws.184
When residents of the Santiago Acahualtepec neighborhood in Mexico City complained
to their municipal government that their drinking water was orange and brown and filled
with garbage and red worms (gusanos rojos), authorities told them their water was
fine.185 So they took their story to Uno Más Uno in an attempt to pressure government
administrators to fix the problem. When a lack of maintenance on three government-run
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water treatment plants resulted in pollution in the Balsas River in Michoacan, local
alderman Jacobo Díaz Ortega made sure the newspaper knew that the federal government
was failing to enforce its own water-quality laws.186 When water service unexpectedly
shut down in Culiacan during a heat wave, resulting in thirty children being treated for
dehydration, reporter Carlos Velázquez informed readers that neither the Board of
Drinking Water and Sewage nor municipal authorities could explain the outage, and
neither intervened to relieve problems associated with the shortage.187 When open canals
carrying sewage from Mexico City threatened the inhabitants of Mixtiahuala, Hidalgo, a
local ejido commissary, Rafael Aguirre, accused state delegates, the Ministry of
Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health of not fulfilling their promises to install
underground sewage pipes through the community. 188 All of these examples describe
attempts by Mexican citizens to hold their government accountable on issues surrounding
water quality and environmental regulation. They were not even asking for new laws,
they merely wanted their government to follow the laws it had already legislated by
providing its citizens with clean drinking water.
Journalists also described government environmental policy failures. In a story
about some of the environmental problems impacting the Valley of Mexico, reporter
Alicia Ortiz noted the lack of sewer service for nearly five million inhabitants. She
interviewed Jorge González Torres, a member of the Mexican Environmental Alliance,
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who argued that the federal government had not shown any interest in diminishing the
impacts of pollution and that “vested interests hinder any possible solutions.”189 As an
example of this he noted “the constant urban growth, promoted by large residential
constructions that, authorized by the government, little by little have been destroying [the
valley’s] green spaces.” González Torres blamed the federal government’s decades-long
centralization policy for giving rise to many of the environmental and health problems
afflicting residents in the Valley of Mexico.
In a similar manner, Alejandro Rosales Jiménez, the environmental manager for
the city of Orizaba, told Teresa Weiser that industrial development gave rise to a
mutually beneficial economic relationship between local workers and local governments
which encouraged neglect for water supplies, like that occurring in his city’s Blanco
River. He explained that “there is a kind of mutual blackmail between representatives of
capital and labor and the game of concessions in different branches, all in contempt of
sound public administration for the benefit of communities.190 In other words, Rosales
Jiménez believed the links between government, business, and labor had been corrupted
to a point to which the very political structure of Mexico could not address the nation’s
most pressing environmental concerns. In a way, this was the ultimate policy failure in
that the basic method by which the Mexican government did business prevented the
government from fulfilling its role as champion of the people it governed.
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Some journalists accused foreign nations of polluting the waters of Mexico, either
from ocean currents or through the foreign-owned industries established in their country.
Fausto Fernandez Ponte reported on a study conducted by the College of Mexico that
found that maquiladoras were dangerous places to work and that they dumped very
dangerous wastes into rivers along the border with the United States. The story had
plenty of blame to go around – accusing maquiladora plants in general for industrial
neglect and the Mexican government for failing to properly regulate these border
industries – but they placed the majority of the blame on foreign nations like the United
States or Japan who had constructed the plants to take advantage of Mexico’s cheap
labor. Clearly, the United States and Japanese governments were not operating these
maquiladoras, rather it was businesses based in those countries. But the article did not
make this distinction, instead referring to “maquiladora plants of the United States, Japan,
and other countries.”191 This phrasing clearly meant to accuse the economic policies of
these nations that encouraged the simultaneous exploitation of Mexican labor and
degradation of Mexican water. In the very same week, reporter Javier Cruz filed a short
story about research conducted by Catsuo Nichicawa, who found that the United States
polluted the Pacific Ocean with chromium, lead, and insecticides, which the California
current then carried south to Baja California where it damaged fish populations.192 In
both of these stories, reporters presented a foreign government as guilty of damaging
Mexico’s water, thereby shifting blame away from Mexicans.
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A fourth group that journalists tended to blame for water crises were Mexican
citizens in general, who some reporters characterized as lacking in environmental
awareness. For example, in a story announcing the construction of three new water
treatment plants designed to help clean up Lake Chapala, the manager of the Jalisco
Public Works Department, Manuel Gómez Garza, explained that “the federal government
would promise to control the industrial waste deposited in the water if state authorities
would try to prevent local residents from throwing trash in the lake.”193 While some
locals probably did use the lake as a dumping ground, the federal government, in
promoting heavy industrial development in the headwaters of the Lerma River basin, of
which Lake Chapala was a part, deserved most of the blame for the lake’s deteriorating
condition. But the story presented the government as the protector of the lake, and
described local Mexicans as ignorant yokels incapable of environmental foresight.
Moreover, blaming the locals shifted blame from the government-encouraged industrial
complex 470 miles upstream.
Blaming the citizens for the loss of water resources was a popular theme in the
pages of Excélsior during in 1983, a trend that is explained by its tendency to deflect
blame away from the federal government due to its government-friendly staff. A
September 1983 story consulted many different government administrators in a
discussion of the barriers to environmental regulation and pollution prevention. Enrique
Gastélum Ramos, the General Director of Water Use and Prevention of Pollution for
SARH, explained that “there exists an absolute lack of awareness among ordinary
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citizens towards the conservation and protection of natural resources.”194 Another story
described a SARH-imposed ban on the drilling of new water wells in Ensenada, Baja
California, in order to prevent the overexploitation of the region’s groundwater.
Campesinos who broke this law would be fined 50,000 pesos.195 In this story, the
government stepped in to safeguard a precious resource from the short-sighted
campesinos who had foolishly wasted the region’s groundwater. Again, both of these
stories described the Mexican government as the enforcer of the environmental foresight
the citizens of Mexico seemed to lack.
The Government as Protector of Water Resources
Within the sample, government-friendly reporters and government spokespeople
pushed environmental narratives which presented the federal government as the
champion of environmentalism, and deflected blame for water crises to other entities.
This chapter revealed many examples of citizens calling for government action to address
water crises. In turn, when the federal government fined corporations for polluting water,
or spent money on facilities to clean water supplies, it promoted these efforts in Excélsior
and Uno Más Uno. As political scientist Stephen Mumme has pointed out, President De
la Madrid promoted an environmental agenda throughout his term as a way to preempt
any non-governmental environmental criticism.196 The frequent reports of government-
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directed environmental action found in the sample used for this thesis further supports his
analysis. Stories presenting the government’s perspective presented readers with a very
different narrative from those crafted by educators and public watchdogs. Instead, these
narratives asserted that the federal government knew about the nation’s water problems
and was taking effective action to remedy them. Despite the larger number of stories in
this sample of water crises written by environmentalists, the federal government
responded with a similarly proportioned number of stories promoting their counternarrative of government environmental sensitivity.197
One of the federal government’s duties was to enforce environmental standards
and punish those who did not comply, so when bureaucrats upheld this responsibility they
used newspapers to promote their actions. An Excélsior story from October 1983
informed readers that the Ministry of Communications and Transport fined the captains
and owners of thirty-eight boats caught polluting Mexican seas with food waste,
packaging, and other garbage.198 This story served as a warning to those who would
pollute Mexican waterways, but it also conveyed to the reading public a message of
government authority to regulate environmental issues such as water crises.
The most popular method by which the federal government promoted its
environmental proactivity through newspapers in this sample was with the
announcements of wastewater treatment plant constructions. Two weeks before Teresa
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Weiser’s story about pollution in the Blanco River in April 1984, a news brief appeared
in the same paper announcing a study by SEDUE to determine the feasibility of
constructing a new water treatment plant along the very same river in order to treat the
pollution and make the water drinkable again.199 The following month, a SEDUE
spokesmen once again used Uno Más Uno to promote a plan under study that would
construct twenty new water treatment plants across the country over a six year period,
thereby reducing national river pollution by seventy-five percent.200 In both of these
stories, the spokesmen failed to blame any particular industry or city for polluting the
rivers, they merely stated that the government knew about the problem and technocrats
were working to solve it. This kind of reporting avoided accusing anyone, and instead
presented a better future brought about by the federal government.
Environmental reporters wrote more frequently on water crises than on any other
environmental issue, and they reported on the subject by educating readers about the
ways in which water crises negatively impacted them, by serving as public watchdogs
that accused different groups for causing the pollution, and by defending the federal
government’s efforts to address the crises. The quantity of these stories suggests that
Mexican readers in the 1980s worried about water quality and scarcity issues, and wanted
to know who and what was threatening this vital resource. Furthermore, the quantity of
stories about the government’s mitigation attempts suggests a smaller, but still culturally
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significant, attempt by the federal government to reassure readers that they could place
trust in their nation’s government to protect Mexico’s water supply.
When compared with the other two environmental issues analyzed in this thesis,
air pollution and forests, water crisis reporting was the most frequent, and reporters
presented it with more foreboding urgency than they did stories on the other two issues.
There certainly were a few editorials and stories about air pollution that warned how
deadly breathing Mexico City’s air could be, and some reporters presented stories about
the loss of Mexico’s forests as if a great plague of devastation were sweeping the country,
but these were limited in number. The sheer quantity of water pollution stories, especially
the ones reporting on water-borne epidemics and dangerous chemical pollution, suggests
that reporters viewed water crises as a more immediate, widespread threat to the health of
Mexicans.
Given the importance of water to human life and its role as a vector of
communicable disease, this proliferation of stories concerned with Mexico’s water supply
is not surprising. Trees were important to the economy and their removal could
eventually lead to erosion and desertification, but their destruction did not give rise to
immediate human health concerns. And while breathing the air in Mexico City could be
deadly, it mostly impacted the city’s sensitive populations such as children or the elderly,
and usually one needed prolonged exposure in order to get sick. Water was both vital to
Mexico’s health and an immediate threat to its people, and this explains its popularity as
an environmental topic.
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CONCLUSION
Excélsior, Uno Más Uno, and the Awakening of Mexican Environmentalism
“Don’t worry Federico. No matter how it shocks us, we must admit that the
Revolution tamed Mexico forever.”
He hadn’t seen the resentful eyes, the caged tigers lurking in the nervous bodies
of the youths sitting watching the smog drift by.201
–

Carlos Fuentes

In his short story The Mandarin, Mexican novelist Carlos Fuentes contrasted the
old and the new Mexico City through the life of Federico, an old man clinging to the
extravagance, ritual, and beauty of the past even as the growing, polluted, soulless city
endeavored to destroy any trace of its former charms. The above quote foreshadows a
violent end to Federico – there is no room for such nonsense in Fuentes’s monstrous,
modern Mexico City – but, written in the 1970s, it also foreshadowed the rise in
environmental advocacy of the following decade. Despite attempts by the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) to maintain an acquiescent, controlled, “tame” population, its
failure to adequately address the nation’s mounting crises, including the environmental
one, provoked a surge in advocacy documented in the pages of Mexico’s newspapers.
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This story, along with many of Fuentes’s other works, expressed a disgust with
what Mexico had become, a disgust reflected in the environmental narratives which many
other Mexicans contributed to Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 1984. Those
activists who chose not to sit idly by as industrial corporations and millions of vehicles
flooded their air and water with poison, and as logging corporations clear cut their forests
leaving behind degraded landscapes, all with tacit approval from the federal government,
truly achieved a momentous task in the 1980s: they made it socially acceptable to
challenge the PRI.
The movement only grew as the decade progressed and newspapers documented a
series of environmental disasters, both within the country and without, that further
weakened PRI hegemony. An explosion at a Pemex gas plant in San Juan Ixhuatepec
killed 500 people in November 1984, and sparked both outrage and environmental
awareness. Less than a year later, a massive earthquake in September 1985 killed around
10,000 people in Mexico City, spawning the creation of many new environmental
nongovernmental organizations concerned with providing basic services for hundreds of
squatter communities whose residents became homeless after the quake.202 Two months
after the earthquake, the first national meeting of environmental nongovernmental groups
took place, forming the Pact of Ecologist Groups, which later proved vital in organizing
opposition to President Miguel de la Madrid’s plans to build Mexico’s first nuclear power
plant in Laguna Verde, Veracruz. Announced just five months after the nuclear disaster
of Chernobyl, and with the memories of the Mexico City earthquake still fresh in
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people’s minds, the Laguna Verde project faced fierce resistance from both these new
environmental groups and newspapers. Although the government succeeded in building
the plant, several historians have argued that fear of a nuclear accident (and doubt over
the federal government’s ability to prevent one) marked the first truly national unification
around an environmental issue.203
As this thesis has suggested, newspapers reflected the development of
environmentalism (and government attempts to co-opt the movement) by providing a
voice for the many different groups wishing to promote their specific environmental
narratives. The battle surrounding air pollution centered around narratives crafted by
reporters serving as public watchdogs and educators, who blamed those responsible for
its creation, and listed the ill-health effects of breathing in polluted areas. While
environmental journalists and scientific researchers worked to blame industries for
disregarding environmental legislation or the federal government for failing to enforce it,
authoritarian journalists and government spokespeople countered with the narrative that
the Mexican people lacked environmental awareness, and that their failure to properly
maintain their vehicles was the biggest contributor to air pollution.
The forest narrative split into two major themes, environmentalists, researchers,
and campesinos who worked to document deforestation and its attendant ecological
degradation and wise-use advocates who believed that forest resources should and could
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be better managed to contribute to Mexico’s economy. Authoritarian journalists and
government spokespeople supported the latter position, and tried to convince the nation
that the ejido system should be replaced with the privatization of forest resources in order
to establish a more productive and environmentally-friendly logging regime.
The battle over water supplies featured narratives similar to those seen with air
pollution, in which public watchdogs and educators explained the factors behind water
crises to readers. Environmentalists, the poor, and researchers argued that industries and
cities were contaminating water supplies and that the federal government was failing to
protect the nation’s drinking water. Government administrators and authoritarian
journalists represented the opposing view, which tried to convince readers that the federal
government was levying fines against polluters and enforcing legislation that safeguarded
Mexico’s water.
In all of these issues, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno presented numerous
environmental narratives concerning Mexico’s resources. Environmentalists, fearing for
the future of Mexico’s environment and recently emboldened by the PRI’s failure to
effectively manage the economy, tried to document the damage and blame those
responsible for causing it or allowing it to happen. They served as the nation’s reality
check, presenting information as they saw it, not as the PRI wanted it presented. The
federal government, working to maintain its hegemony and stave off the development of
any autonomous civic groups, promoted itself as the protector of Mexico’s environment
and tried to deflect any blame for environmental problems onto other groups, such as
campesinos, specific corporations, or the Mexican people in general. Despite all of these
new challenges to the PRI, Mexico’s ruling party remained in control of the nation until
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2000, even though they had to rig the 1988 presidential election in order to do so.204 So
although the environmental reporters of these two papers writing in 1983 and 1984 did
not bring about a regime change with subsequent shifts in environmental policy, they did
contribute to the legitimization of government criticism and helped spread an awareness
of environmental issues that still proliferates in Mexico today.

Ginger Thompson, “Ex-President in Mexico Casts New Light on Rigged 1988 Election,” New
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Table 1:
Distribution of five most popular environmental topics among the
sample of 216 stories
Number of Stories

Percentage of Total

Water Crises

62

29%

Forests

43

20%

Air Pollution

28

13%

Agricultural Problems

22

10%

Oil Issues

18

8%

Table 2:

Distribution of air pollution topics among the sample of 28 stories
Number of Occurrences

Percentage of Total***

Blaming Someone

18

64%

Linking to Other Issue

14

50%

Government as Solution

6

21%

***Numbers do not add up to 100 because some stories have occurrences that fit
into multiple categories.
Table 3:

Distribution of forest topics among the sample of 43 stories
Number of Occurrences

Percentage of Total***

“Irracional” Forest Use

27

63%

Environmental Damage

22

51%

Government as Solution

8

18%

***Numbers do not add up to 100 because some stories have occurrences that fit
into multiple categories.
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Table 4:

Distribution of water crisis topics among the sample of 62 stories
Number of Occurrences

Percentage of Total***

Blaming Someone

35

56%

Describing Water

29

47%

Government as Solution

14

23%

Crises

***Numbers do not add up to 100 because some stories have occurrences that fit
into multiple categories.

Table 5:

Number of Narratives Defending the Federal Government by topic
Number of Stories

Percentage by Category

Air Pollution

6

21%

Forests

8

18%

Water Crises

14

23%

